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This paper quantiﬁes the gains from openness arising from trade and
multinational production ðMPÞ. We present a model that captures key
dimensions of the interaction between these two ﬂows: trade and MP
are competing ways to serve a foreign market, MP relies on imports of
intermediate goods from the home country, and foreign afﬁliates of
multinationals can export part of their output. The calibrated model
implies that the gains from trade can be twice as high as the gains cal-
culatedintrade-onlymodels,whilethegainsfromMPareslightlylower
than the gains computed in MP-only models.
I. Introduction
There is an extensive literature on the gains that countries derive from
interacting with each other. The attention has been focused on quan-
tifying the gains from single mechanisms in isolation, especially trade in
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All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditionsgoods ðe.g., Eaton and Kortum 2002Þ and, to a lesser extent, foreign di-
rect investment ðFDIÞ, or multinational production ðMPÞð e.g., Burstein
and Monge-Naranjo 2009; McGrattan and Prescott 2009; Ramondo
2012Þ.
1 Much less attention has been given to the quantiﬁcation of the
gains from openness when countries interact through both trade and
MP. This is an important omission in light of the strong interactions that
exist between trade and MP and given that trade agreements often com-
bine tariff reductions and removal of barriers to MP. In this paper, we con-
struct and calibrate a general equilibrium multicountry model of trade
and MP. Because of the rich interactions between these two ﬂows in our
model, we ﬁnd higher gains from trade than in existing trade-only mod-
els, while our computed gains from MP are slightly lower than those in
models with only MP.
We build on the Ricardian model of international trade developed
by Eaton and Kortum ð2002Þ. Our main innovation is to incorporate MP
into the model by allowing a country’s technologies to be used for pro-
duction abroad. The model has tradable intermediate goods and non-
tradable consumption goods, as in Alvarez and Lucas ð2007Þ. For non-
tradable goods, serving a foreign market can be done only through MP,
but for tradable goods we have to consider the choice between exports
and MP.
2 Trade ﬂows are affected by iceberg-type costs that may vary
across country pairs. To avoid these costs, or to beneﬁt from lower pro-
duction costs abroad, ﬁrms producing tradable goods may prefer to
serve a foreign market through MP rather than through exports. We as-
sume that MP entails some efﬁciency losses that may vary across country
pairs. Further, we allow for the possibility that multinationals’ foreign
afﬁliates use imported inputs from their home country; in our empiri-
cal approach, we think of this as intraﬁrm trade.
3 Our setup also allows
ﬁrms to use a third country as a “bridge,” or export platform, to serve a
particular market; we refer to this as bridge MP, or simply BMP. For ex-
ample, a ﬁrm from country i producing a tradable good can serve coun-
try n by doing MP in country l and shipping it to country n. This entails
1 Multinational production measures the sales of foreign afﬁliates of multinational ﬁrms.
This is arguably at least as important as trade: For example, in 2007, total worldwide MP was
almost twice as high as total world exports ðUNCTAD 2009Þ.
2 A signiﬁcant part of MP ﬂows is in nontradable goods. Around 50 percent of the value
of production by US afﬁliates of foreign multinationals is in sectors other than manufac-
turing, agriculture, and mining ðour own calculations from the Bureau of Economic Anal-
ysis ½BEA Þ. Additionally, according to UNCTAD ð2009Þ, in 2007, FDI stocks in the service
sector represented more than 60 percent of the total stock in developed countries.
3 The empirical evidence points to signiﬁcant intraﬁrm trade ﬂows related to multina-
tional activities ðBernard, Jensen, and Schott 2005; Hanson, Mataloni, and Slaughter 2005;
Alfaro and Charlton 2009Þ. According to our own calculations using data from the BEA,
intraﬁrm imports from their headquarters represent more than 7.5 percent of total gross
production done by foreign afﬁliates of American multinationals.
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Our model captures several dimensions of the complex interaction
between trade and MP. First, as in models of “horizontal” FDI ðe.g.,
Horstmann and Markusen 1992; Brainard 1997; Markusen and Venables
2000; Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple 2004Þ, trade and MP are competing
ways to serve a foreign market.
5 This implies that an increase in trade
costs generates smaller welfare losses, as MP partiallyreplaces the decline
in trade. Second, as in models of “vertical” FDI ðe.g., Helpman ½1984,
1985  and, more recently, Keller and Yeaple ½2010 Þ, the reliance by for-
eign afﬁliates on imports of home country inputs implies that MP boosts
trade and trade facilitates MP.
6 This complementarity between trade and
MP implies that an increase in trade costs leads to larger welfare losses
through an indirect negative impact on MP. Finally, complementarity
between trade and MP also arises in our model because of the presence
of BMP: since BMP ﬂows entail both trade and MP ﬂows, an increase in
tradecostsdecreasesMPassociatedwithBMPandgenerateslargerlosses.
The existence of these forces of substitutability and complementar-
ity between trade and MP implies that models with only trade and mod-
els with only MP may generate inaccurate estimates of the gains from
trade and MP.
7 If complementarity forces dominate, for example, the
gains from trade calculated in trade-only models will be lower than those
in our model, which takes appropriate account of such forces by calcu-
lating the gains from trade as the increase in real income as we move
from a counterfactual situation with only MP to the equilibrium with
both trade and MP. Similarly, the gains from MP calculated in MP-only
models may also be incorrect. An important goal in this paper is to gauge
the strength of substitutability and complementarity forces and then to
explore their effect on the gains from trade and MP.
4 Foreign subsidiaries of multinationals often sell a sizable part of their output outside
of the host country of production. For example, US afﬁliates in Europe export, on average,
30 percent of their output ðBlonigen 2005Þ.
5 Studies using ﬁrm-level data ﬁnd evidence of such substitutability between trade and
MP when considering narrow product lines ðsee Belderbos and Sleuwaegen 1988; Head
and Ries 2001, 2004; Barba Navaretti and Venables 2004Þ. For example, the increased
presence of Japanese automakers in the United States accompanied a decline in auto-
mobile exports from Japan ðHead and Ries 2001Þ.
6 Several studies ﬁnd that higher FDI leads to an increase in exports of parts and sup-
plies from the home country to foreign afﬁliates ðsee Belderbos and Sleuwaegen 1998;
Blonigen 2001; Head and Ries 2001; Barba Navaretti and Venables 2004; Head, Ries, and
Spencer 2004Þ.
7 Gains from trade ðMPÞ are deﬁned as the increase in the real wage from the counter-
factual equilibrium when trade ðMPÞ costs are taken to inﬁnity to the benchmark equilib-
rium.For estimatesof gainsfrom tradein trade-only models, seeEaton andKortumð2002Þ,
Alvarez and Lucas ð2007Þ, Waugh ð2010Þ, and Fieler ð2011Þ. For estimates of gains from
MP in MP-only models, see Burstein and Monge-Naranjo ð2009Þ, McGrattan and Prescott
ð2009Þ, and Ramondo ð2012Þ.
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for a set of OECD countries, as well as data on intraﬁrm trade ﬂows for
US multinationals and foreign multinationals operating in the United
States. For countries with high inward MP ﬂows, the gains from trade
calculated with our model can be much higher than the gains calculated
in trade-only models.
8 For example, the gains from trade implied by our
model for New Zealand are between 8 and 10 percent, whereas trade-
only models imply gains of around 4 percent. The reason is that trade
facilitates MP by allowing multinationals’ foreign afﬁliates to import in-
puts from their home country. Of course, the fact that trade and MP are
competing ways to serve foreign markets tends to make the gains from
trade in our model lower than in trade-only models, but the large im-
ports of home country inputs by foreign afﬁliates observed in the data
imply that complementarity forces dominate in the model. Since MP en-
tails the sharing of technologies across countries, the result that trade
facilitatesMPcapturesthecommonbutlargelyinformalnotionthattrade
enhances international technology diffusion.
9 In contrast to this result
for the gains from trade, the gains from MP calculated in our calibrated
model are slightly lower than the gains computed in MP-only models.
The reason is that in our model, the substitutability forces associated
with the fact that trade and MP are competing ways of serving a foreign
market dominate the complementarity forces created by BMP.
Our model is, in principle, consistent with the notion that the real-
location of production to foreign countries by US multinationals could
depress US wages because outward MP could lead to a decline in US
exports, worsening its terms of trade.
10 But there are two countervailing
forces: First, outward MP generates a demand for intermediate-good
exports from the United States to foreign subsidiaries of US multina-
tionals, and, second, outward MP increases worldwide productivity, and
this beneﬁts consumers everywhere and in the United States. Our cali-
brated model shows that these two positive forces roughly balance the
negative terms of trade force for the United States, and, hence, outward
MP has basically no net effect on the US real wage.
8 Our results for trade-only models are derived from our model by driving MP costs to
inﬁnity. These results are equivalent to those of Arkolakis, Costinot, and Rodrı ´guez-Clare
ð2012Þ, who show that for an important class of models, the gains from trade are given by
a simple formula combining the share of total expenditures devoted to domestic goods
ðan inversemeasureoftradeopennessÞandtheelasticityoftradeﬂowswithrespecttotrade
costs.
9 Yet, our model does not incorporate any causal link whereby trade or MP enhances
international knowledge spillovers. The related literature is surveyed in Keller ð2004Þ.
10 Similar ideas have been presented in relation to the debate about offshoring by rich
countries; see Samuelson ð2004Þ and Rodrı ´guez-Clare ð2010Þ. See also the empirical work
on the effect of outward FDI on employment in the United States by Harrison and Mc-
Milan ð2011Þ and in Germany by Becker and Muendler ð2010Þ.
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ðforthcomingÞ and Irarrazabal, Moxnes, and Opromolla ð2013Þ. Garetto
develops a model in which multinationals from the rich country pro-
duce intermediategoodsinlow-wagelocationsandthenshipthosegoods
back home for ﬁnal assembly and consumption ðthere is no BMPÞ.G a r -
etto’s model entails an extreme type of complementarity between trade
and MP: without trade there would be no MP. Irarrazabal et al. intro-
duceintraﬁrmtradeintoHelpmanetal.’sð2004Þ“proximity-concentration
trade-off” model of trade and MP to explain the high correlation ob-
served between these two ﬂows across country pairs. The model does
not allow for multinationals’ foreign afﬁliates to export their produc-
tion ðthere is no BMPÞ. Consistent with our results, Irarrazabal et al. ﬁnd
gains from MP that are smaller than the gains that would be computed
in models with only MP, again, because of the substitutability forces be-
tween trade and MP. But the absence of BMP implies that the gains
from MP computed by Irarrazabal et al. are signiﬁcantly lower than the
ones we calculate using our model.
We acknowledge that countries could be gaining from openness in
ways other than through trade and MP. In particular, technologies orig-
inated in one country may be used in other countries in ways that are
not recorded as MP. This happens, for example, if US technologies are
used for production in Canada by Canadian ﬁrms. This way of sharing
technologies is partly captured as royalties and license fees from unaf-
ﬁliated foreign sources, but, for the most part, this leaves no clear paper
trail.
11 Klenow and Rodrı ´guez-Clare ð2005Þ, Rodrı ´guez-Clare ð2007Þ, and
Ramondo and Rodrı ´guez-Clare ð2010Þ all follow indirect model-based
approaches to compute gains from openness that, in principle, include
all ways through which countries share technologies. In contrast, the ap-
proach in this paper is to restrict our attention to the gains from open-
ness that take place through trade and MP, which have clear counter-
parts in the data.
II. The Model
We extend Eaton and Kortum’s ð2002Þ model of trade to incorporate
MP. Our model is Ricardian with a continuum of tradable intermediate
goods and nontradable ﬁnal goods, produced under constant returns to
scale. We adopt the probabilistic representation of technologies as ﬁrst
introduced by Eaton and Kortum, but we enrich it to incorporate MP.
11 According to the BEA, total income earned by US multinationals from their foreign
afﬁliates amounted to $325 billion in 2009, whereas in that same year, US income via
royalties and license fees from unafﬁliated foreign sources amounted to a comparatively
low $31 billion.
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the one in Alvarez and Lucas ð2007Þ.
A. The Closed Economy
To introduce the notation and main features of our model, consider,
ﬁrst, a closed economy with L units of labor. A representative agent con-
sumes a continuum of ﬁnal goods indexed by u ∈ ½0; 1  in quantities
q
fðuÞ. Preferences over ﬁnal goods are constant elasticity of substitution
ðCESÞ with elasticity j
f > 0. Final goods are produced with labor and a
continuum of intermediate goods indexed by v ∈ ½0; 1 . Formally, inter-
mediate goods in quantities q
gðvÞ are aggregated into a composite inter-
mediate good via a CES production function with elasticity j
g > 0. ðNote
that we use superscripts f and g to denote variables pertaining to ﬁnal
and intermediate goods, respectively.Þ For simplicity, we henceforth as-
sume that j
g 5 j
f 5 j. Denoting as Q the total quantity of the composite
intermediate good produced, we have
Q 5
E
1
0
q
gðvÞ
ðj21Þ=jdv
j=ðj21Þ
:
The composite intermediate good and labor are used to produce ﬁnal
goods via Cobb-Douglas technologies:
q
fðuÞ 5 z
fðuÞL
fðuÞ
aQ
fðuÞ
12a: ð1Þ
The variables L
fðuÞ and Q
fðuÞ denote the quantity of labor and the com-
posite intermediate good used in the production of ﬁnal good u, respec-
tively, and z
fðuÞ is a productivity parameter for good u. Similarly, inter-
mediate goods are produced according to
q
gðvÞ 5 z
gðvÞL
gðvÞ
bQ
gðvÞ
12b: ð2Þ
Resource constraints are
E
1
0
L
fðuÞdu 1E
1
0
L
gðvÞdv 5 L;
E
1
0
Q
fðuÞdu 1E
1
0
Q
gðvÞdv 5 Q:
To complete the description of the environment in the closed economy,
the productivity parameters z
fðuÞ and z
gðvÞ are drawn independently
from a Fre ´chet distribution with parameters T and v > maxf1; j 2 1g,
namely, FðzÞ 5 expð2Tz
2vÞ for z > 0.
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venient to introduce the notions of an input bundle for the production of
ﬁnal goods and an input bundle for the production of intermediate goods, both
of which are produced via Cobb-Douglas production functions with la-
bor and the composite intermediate good and used to produce ﬁnal
and intermediate goods, as speciﬁed in ð1Þ and ð2Þ, respectively. The
unit cost of the input bundle for ﬁnal goods is c
f 5 Aw
aðP
gÞ
12a, and the
unit cost of the input bundle for intermediate goods is c
g 5 Bw
bðP
gÞ
12b,
where w and P
g are the wage and the price of the composite intermedi-
ate good, respectively, and A and B are constants that depend on a and
b, respectively. In a competitive equilibrium, prices of ﬁnal goods are
given by p
fðuÞ 5 c
f=z
fðuÞ, and prices of intermediate goods are given by
p
gðvÞ 5 c
g=z
gðvÞ. In turn, the aggregate price for intermediates is P
g 5
½∫
1
0p
gðvÞ
12jdv 
1=ð12jÞ. Figure 1 illustrates the cost structure in the closed
economy.
The characterization of the equilibrium closely follows the analysis in
Eaton and Kortum ð2002Þ and Alvarez and Lucas ð2007Þ, so we omit the
details. Sufﬁce it to say here that the equilibrium real wage is given by
w
P f 5 ~ g   T
ð11hÞ=v; ð3Þ
where P
f 5 ½∫
1
0 p
fðuÞ
12jdu 
1=ð12jÞ is the price index for ﬁnal goods, h ;
ð1 2 aÞ=b, and ~ g is a positive constant.
B. The World Economy
Now consider a set of countries indexed by i ∈ f1;: : : ;Ig with pref-
erences and technologies as described above. Country i has Li units of
labor.
FIG.1 . —Cost structure in the closed economy
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each ﬁnal good and each intermediate good, at home or abroad. These
technologies are described by the vectors z
f
i ðuÞ ; fz
f
1iðuÞ; :::; z
f
IiðuÞg
and z
g
iðvÞ ; fz
g
1iðvÞ; :::; z
g
IiðvÞg. When a country i produces in another
country l ≠ i, we say that there is multinational production or MP by
country i in country l. Sometimes, we also say that MP in country l is car-
ried out by country i’s “multinationals.” The corresponding productivity
parameter in this case is z
f
liðuÞ or z
g
liðvÞ. We adopt the convention that
the subscript n denotes the destination country, subscript l denotes the
country of production, and subscript i denotes the country in which the
technology originates. Note that if z
f
liðuÞ 5 z
g
liðvÞ 5 0 whenever l ≠ i, for
all u, v ∈ ½0;1 , our model becomes virtually identical to Alvarez and
Lucas’s ð2007Þ version of Eaton and Kortum’s ð2002Þ model of trade
with no MP.
12
Trade and MP costs.—Intermediate goods are tradable, but ﬁnal goods
are not. Trade is subject to iceberg-type costs: dnl ≥ 1 units of any good
must be shipped from country l for one unit to arrive in country n.W e
assume that dnn 5 1 for all n and that the triangle inequality holds: dnl
≤ dnjdjl for all n, l, j. Similarly, MP is subject to costs that we model
as iceberg-type efﬁciency losses. Letting c
f
li and c
g
li denote the unit costs
of the input bundle for ﬁnal and intermediate goods in country l for
ﬁrms from country i, respectively, MP costs imply that c
s
li may be differ-
ent from c
s
l ; c
s
ll for l ≠ i and s 5 f, g. When trade and MP costs are
taken into account, the unit cost of a ﬁnal good u in country n pro-
duced with a technology from country i is c
f
ni=z
f
niðuÞ, while the unit cost
of an intermediate good v in country n produced in country l with a
technology from country i is c
g
lidnl=z
g
liðvÞ.
We now provide additional detail about our assumptions regarding
MP costs. For ﬁnal goods, we simply assume that there is an iceberg
cost h
f
li ≥ 1 associated with using a technology from i to produce in l,
with h
f
ii 5 1 for all i. This implies that c
f
li 5 c
f
l h
f
li while c
f
l 5 Aw
a
l ðP
g
l Þ
12a.
For intermediate goods, we assume that MP requires the use of what
we call a multinational input bundle for the production of intermediate goods.
In particular, we assume that the multinational input bundle combines
thenationalinputbundlefromthehomecountryði.e.,thecountrywhere
the technology originatesÞ and the host country ði.e., the country where
production takes placeÞ. The home country’s national input bundle
must be shipped to the host country, and this implies paying the corre-
12 We say “virtually identical” rather than “identical” because our model exhibits varying
productivity levels acrossa continuumof ﬁnal goods, whereas in Alvarez and Lucas’s ð2007Þ
model there is a single ﬁnal good. In our model, T also affects the productivity of ﬁnal
goods. Hence, while in Alvarez and Lucas’s model the real wage is proportional to T
h=v,i n
our setup, the real wage is proportional to T
ð11hÞ=v ðin Eaton and Kortum ½2002 , the real
wage is proportional to T
1=bv since they do not have nontradable goodsÞ.
280 journal of political economy
This content downloaded from 169.229.128.49 on Wed, 19 Jun 2013 20:20:51 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditionssponding transportation cost. The unit cost of the home country’s na-
tional input bundle used in MP by country i in country l is then c
g
i dli.
The host country’s national input bundle has unit cost c
g
l , but MP in in-
termediates incurs an efﬁciency loss of h
g
li ≥ 1, so the unit cost of the host
country’s national input used in MP by i in l is c
g
l h
g
li. When the costs of
the home and host countries’ national input bundles are combined into
a CES aggregator, the unit cost of the multinational input bundle for
intermediates produced by i in l is
c
g
li 5 ½ð1 2 aÞðc
g
l h
g
liÞ
12y1 aðc
g
i dliÞ
12y 
1=ð12yÞ; ð4Þ
where a ∈ ½0; 1  and y > 1. Note that c
g
ii 5 c
g
i 5 Bw
b
iðP
g
i Þ
12b. Moreover, if
a 5 0, then c
g
li 5 c
g
l h
g
li. The parameter y indicates the degree of substi-
tutability between the national input bundles from the home and host
countries.
Productivity distributions.—We assume that the productivity vectors
z
f
iðuÞ and z
g
iðvÞ for each good are random variables that are drawn inde-
pendently across goods and countries from a multivariate Fre ´chet dis-
tribution with parameters Ti, v > maxf1; j 2 1g, and r ∈ ½0; 1Þ, namely,
Fðz
s
i;TiÞ 5 exp

2Ti

o
l
ðz
s
liÞ
2v=ð12rÞ
12r
ð5Þ
for s 5 f, g.
13 Note that
lim
x→`
Fðx; x; :::; z
s
li;: : : ;x;TiÞ 5 exp½2Tiðz
s
liÞ
2v ;
so that the marginal distributions are Fre ´chet. The parameter r deter-
mines the degree of correlation among the elements of z
s
i:i fr 5 0, pro-
ductivity levels are uncorrelated across production locations, while in
the limit as r → 1 they are perfectly correlated, so that productivity is
independent of the location of production ði.e., z
s
ii 5 z
s
li, for all lÞ.
C. Equilibrium Analysis
In a competitive equilibrium, the price of ﬁnal good u in country n is
simply the minimum unit cost at which this good can be obtained, p
f
nðuÞ
5 mini c
f
ni=z
f
niðuÞ. Similarly, the price of intermediate good v in country
n is p
g
nðvÞ 5 mini;l c
g
lidnl=z
g
liðvÞ. Note that if l 5 i, then the intermediate
good is exported from i to n, while if i ≠ l 5 n, there is MP from i to n.
Finally, if i ≠ l and l ≠ n, then country i uses country l as an export plat-
form to serve country n. We say that, in this case, there is bridge MP, or
simply BMP, by country i in country l.
13 This distribution is discussed in Eaton and Kortum ð2002, n. 14Þ.
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tures across exporters is elegantly characterized by simple formulas of
the technology parameters, unit costs, and trade costs. Thanks to the
assumption that technologies are distributed according to the multivar-
iate Fre ´chet distribution, this property extends in a natural way in our
model to the allocation of expenditures across technology sources and
production locations ðsee App. AÞ. For ﬁnal ðnontradableÞ goods, the
result is quite simple: The share of expenditures by country n on ﬁnal
goods produced in country n with country i technologies is
p
f
ni 5
Tiðc
f
niÞ
2v
ojTjðc
f
njÞ
2v : ð6Þ
For intermediate ðtradableÞ goods, we need to take into account all the
different ways in which they can be made available to a particular coun-
try. As shown in Appendix A, the share of expenditures by country n on
intermediate goods produced in country l with country i technologies is
p
g
nli 5
Tið~ c
g
niÞ
2v
ojTjð~ c
g
njÞ
2v
ðc
g
lidnlÞ
2v=ð12rÞ
okðc
g
kidnkÞ
2v=ð12rÞ ; ð7Þ
where ~ c
g
ni ; ½okðc
g
kidnkÞ
2v=ð12rÞ 
2ð12rÞ=v.
14 This expression has a natural inter-
pretation: The ﬁrst term on the right-hand side is the share of expen-
ditures that country n allocates to intermediate goods produced with
country i’s technologies ðindependently of the location where they are
producedÞ, while the second term on the right-hand side is the share of
these goods that are produced in country l. The price index for ﬁnal
ðs 5 f Þ and intermediate ðs 5 gÞ goods is given by
P
s
n 5 g

o
i
Tið~ c
s
niÞ
2v
 21=v
; ð8Þ
where ~ c
f
ni 5 c
f
ni and g is a positive constant.
15
We next use the previous results to characterize trade and MP ﬂows
and present the trade balance conditions.
16
Country n’s total expenditures on ﬁnal goods are equal to the coun-
try’s total income, wnLn, while its total expenditures on intermediate
14 Note that when dnl → ` for n ≠ l, ~ c
g
ni 5 c
g
ni and p
g
nni 5 Tiðc
g
niÞ
2v=ojTjðc
g
njÞ
2v, just as in the
case of ﬁnal goods.
15 The constant g ; Gð1 1 ð1 2 jÞ=vÞ
1=ð12jÞ, where Gð Þ is the gamma function.
16 The trade balance conditions are the appropriate equilibrium conditions given that
MP entails no proﬁts under perfect competition.
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g
nQ n 5 hwnLn for
all n ðsee App. AÞ. The value of MP in ﬁnal goods by i in n is then
Y
f
ni 5 p
f
niwnLn; ð9Þ
while the value of MP in intermediates by country i in country l to serve
country n is p
g
nlihwnLn. Thus, MP in intermediates by i in l is
Y
g
li 5 ho
n
p
g
nliwnLn: ð10Þ
Total imports by n from l are given by the imports of intermedi-
ate goods produced in l with technologies from any other country,
hoip
g
nliwnLn, plus the imports of country l’s input bundle for interme-
diates used by country l’s multinationals operating in country n. For
concreteness, we refer to the ﬁrst type of trade as arm’s-length and the
second type of trade as intraﬁrm. To compute intraﬁrm trade ﬂows, let
qnl be the cost share of the home country’s input bundle for the pro-
duction of intermediates in country n by multinationals from country l.
From equation ð4Þ, qnl 5 aðc
g
l dnl=c
g
nlÞ
12y. The value of imports of the in-
put bundle for intermediates by n from l associated with MP by l in n
is qnlY
g
nl. Total imports by country n from l ≠ n are then given by the
sum of arm’s-length trade and intraﬁrm trade,
Xnl 5 ho
i
p
g
nliwnLn 1 qnlY
g
nl: ð11Þ
The trade balance condition for country n is
o
l ≠n
Xnl 5 o
l≠n
Xln: ð12Þ
Since c
g
li is a function of wages w 5 ðw1;: : : ;wIÞ and price indices
P
g 5 ðP
g
1;: : : ;P
g
I Þ, then so are ~ c
g
ni, p
g
nli, Y
g
nl, and Xnl. The price index
equations ð8Þ for s 5 g and the trade balance equations ð12Þ can then
be used to determine the equilibrium wages and price indices in this
economy.
17
For the calibration of our model, a key target will be the trade elas-
ticity, deﬁned as the partial elasticity of relative trade ﬂows with respect
to relative trade costs, ylnð ^ X nl= ^ X nnÞ=ylndnl. Quantitative trade models
17 To compute the equilibrium, we follow an algorithm similar to the one proposed by
Alvarez and Lucas ð2007Þ. In particular, we use the set of equations associated with ð8Þ
for s 5 g and n 5 f1;::: ;Ig to determine a function P
gðwÞ: I → I. Together with P
gðwÞ,
eq. ð8Þ for s 5 f also deﬁnes a function P
fðwÞ for the price index of ﬁnal goods. Using
the function P
gðwÞ, we can think of the trade balance conditions in ð12Þ as a system of I
equations in w. This system of equations, together with some normalization of wages,
yields an equilibrium wage vector w. The functions P
gðwÞ and P
fðwÞ then determine the
price indices for intermediate and ﬁnal goods, respectively, in all countries.
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ð2003Þ, and Eaton, Kortum, and Kramarz ð2011Þ all exhibit the useful
feature that this elasticity is common across countries and equal to a
structural parameter coming from preferences or technology. If we shut
down MP in our model, then the trade elasticity would be given by the
distribution parameter v ðas in Eaton and Kortum ½2002 Þ. In the pres-
ence of MP, however, the trade elasticity is not a constant in our model.
There are two reasons for this. First, arm’s-length and intraﬁrm trade
ﬂows are subject to two different elasticities with respect to trade costs:
the distribution parameter v and the elasticity of substitution between
home and host countries’ input bundles for MP, y 2 1. Second, if r > 0,
there is positive correlation among the productivity parameters associ-
ated with source country i ðz
g
1i; z
g
2i; :::; z
g
IiÞ, whereas there is no correla-
tion among the productivity parameters associated with production lo-
cation l ðz
g
l1; z
g
l2; :::; z
g
lIÞ.
An interesting case arises if r 5 0. For this special case, arm’s-length
trade ﬂows, deﬁned as ^ X nl ; Xnl 2 qnlY
g
nl, satisfy a gravity equation simi-
lar to that in Eaton and Kortum ð2002Þ, except that the technology in
each country is “augmented” by the possibility of MP:
^ Xnl 5
~ T
g
l ðc
g
l dnlÞ
2v
ok ~ T
g
k ðc
g
kdnkÞ
2v hwnLn: ð13Þ
Here, ~ T
g
l ;oiTiðh
g
liÞ
2v is an augmented technology parameter for the
production of intermediate goods in country l that takes into account
the possibility of using technologies from other countries, appropriately
discounted by the efﬁciency losses h
g
li. This implies that country l’s nor-
malized import share in country n depends only on the trade cost dnl
and the price indices P
g
n and P
g
l :
^ Xnl=hwnLn
^ Xll=hwlLl
5

dnlP
g
l
P
g
n
 2v
: ð14Þ
This equation is exactly like the one in Eaton and Kortum ð2002Þ;s e e
their equation ð12Þ.I nt h ec a s ew i t hr 5 0, MP ﬂows also satisfy a gravity-
like relationship. In Appendix A, we describe in detail this relationship.
18
In general, for r ≠ 0 and given that trade data include intraﬁrm trade
ði.e., we have data for Xnl and not for ^ XnlÞ, our calibration procedure
will use the trade elasticity as a target, but this will pin down v only in-
directly together with all the other parameters.
18 Another interesting special case arises when MP costs are zero or separable ði.e.,
h
g
li 5 klmi, for all l, iÞ, in which case the trade elasticity is v=ð1 2 rÞ.
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In this paper, we are particularly interested in quantifying the country-
level gains from trade, MP, and openness. We ﬁrst establish some ter-
minology.
The gains from openness for country n ðGOnÞ a r eg i v e nb yt h ep r o p o r -
tional change in country n’s real wage, wn=P
f
n,a sw em o v ef r o mac o u n -
terfactual equilibrium characterized by isolation, which attains when trade
and MP costs are inﬁnite ðdnl, h
s
li → ` for all n ≠ l, l ≠ i,a n ds 5 f, gÞ,t o
the actual equilibrium.
ThegainsfromtradeforcountrynðGTnÞ are given by the proportional
change in wn=P
f
n as we move from the counterfactual equilibrium with
MP but no trade ðactual h
s
li for all l, i and s 5 f, g but dnl → ` for all
n ≠ lÞ to the actual equilibrium.
Similarly, the gains from MP for country n ðGMPnÞ are given by the pro-
portional change in wn=P
f
n as we move from the counterfactual equilib-
rium with trade but no MP ðactual dnl for all n, l but h
s
li → ` for all l ≠ i
and s 5 f, gÞ to the actual equilibrium. The gains from MP can be de-
composed into those that arise from MP in intermediates, GMP
g
n,a n d
those that arise from MP in ﬁnal goods, GMP
f
n, with GMPn 5 GMP
f
n  
GMP
g
n.
We are interested in comparing GTn and GMPn with the gains that
would be computed in models with only trade and models with only
MP. We label these gains GT*
n and GMP*
n, respectively. Formally, GT*
n is
the proportional change in country n’s real wage as we move from a
counterfactual equilibrium characterized by isolation to an equilibrium
with no MP but with the same trade ﬂows as in the actual equilibrium.
Analogously, GMP*
n is the proportional change in country n’s real wage
as we move from a counterfactual equilibrium characterized by isola-
tion to an equilibrium with no trade but with the same MP ﬂows as in
the actual equilibrium.
19
The following lemma establishes that GT*
n and GMP*
n can be calcu-
lated as simple formulas from trade and MP shares, respectively.
Lemma 1. The gains from trade and the gains from MP in trade-only
and MP-only models, respectively, can be directly calculated from trade
and MP shares as follows:
GT*
n 5

Xnn=o
j
Xnj
 2h=v
; ð15Þ
19 Of course, the trade ðMPÞ costs necessary to yield the same trade ðMPÞ ﬂows as in the
actual equilibrium may be different in a trade-only ðMP-onlyÞ model than in our model
with trade and MP.
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g*
n 5

Y
g
nn=o
j
Y
g
nj
 2h=v
; ð16Þ
GMP
f *
n 5

Y
f
nn=o
j
Y
f
nj
 21=v
; ð17Þ
with the total gains from MP given by GMP*
n 5 GMP
g*
n   GMP
f *
n .
The formula for the gains from trade as a function of normalized
trade ﬂows inequations ð15Þisvery similar to Eaton andKortum’sð2002Þ
equation ð15Þ and exactly the same as the one in Alvarez and Lucas
ð2007Þ. The formula is also consistent with the results in Arkolakis, Costi-
not, and Rodrı ´guez-Clare ð2012Þ. The formulas in equations ð16Þ and
ð17Þ can be seen as natural extensions of these same ideas for the com-
putation of the gains for MP in MP-only models.
One of the main results of our paper is that GTn can be higher or
lower than GT*
n because of the substitutability and complementarity
forces that exist between trade and MP. If GTn > GT*
n, then we say that
trade is an MP complement: the gains from trade are higher than the
ones that would be computed in trade-only models because trade also
leads to gains by facilitating MP. On the contrary, if GTn < GT*
n, then we
say that trade is an MP substitute: the gains from trade are lower than
the ones that would be computed in trade-only models because trade
decreases the gains from MP. If GTn 5 GT*
n, then we say that trade is MP
independent.
Analogously, if GMPn < GMP*
n, then we say that MP is a trade substi-
tute, while if GMPn > GMP*
n ðGMPn 5 GMP*
nÞ, then we say that MP is a
trade complement ðtrade independentÞ.
E. Three Special Cases
Before we present the calibration of the full model in the next section,
it is instructive to consider three special cases for which we can derive
analytical results: ð1Þ the case with a 5 r 5 0 ði.e., no imports of home
inputs associated with MP and no correlation across productivity in dif-
ferent locationsÞ, ð2Þ the case of symmetric countries, and ð3Þ the case
of a rich and a poor country with a 5 0 and frictionless trade. All proofs
are in Appendix A.
1. a 5 r 5 0
The following proposition establishes that if a 5 r 5 0, then trade is MP
independent.
Proposition 1. Assume that a 5 r 5 0. Then, trade is MP inde-
pendent in the sense that GTn 5 GT*
n. Moreover, GOn 5 GT*
n   GMP*
n.
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forces affecting the relationship between trade and MP. First, trade tends
to be an MP complement because of the need to import home country
intermediategoodsbymultinationals’foreignsubsidiaries.Second,trade
tends to be an MP substitute because trade and MP are alternative ways
to serve a particular market. The ﬁrst force is not present if a 5 0 be-
cause in this case, foreign subsidiaries do not demand home country in-
termediate goods. The second force is not present if r 5 0 because with
no correlation across productivities in different locations, there is, in a
sense, no longer a technology that can be used in different countries.
Proposition 1 implies that if a 5 r 5 0, then it would be valid to use the
trade-only model to compute gains from trade. Moreover, as the last part
of the proposition establishes, one can use the trade-only and MP-only
models jointly to compute the overall gains from openness since GOn
5 GT*
n   GMP*
n.
In contrast to the result that trade is MP independent, parameters a 5
r 5 0 do not imply that MP is trade independent. Let bilateral trade
shares be denoted by lnl ; Xnl=ojXnj, and let   lnn be the domestic trade
share in the counterfactual equilibrium with trade but no MP. The fol-
lowingpropositionestablishestherelationship betweenGMPn and GMP*
n
for this case.
Proposition 2. Assume that a 5 r 5 0. Then
GMPn 5 GMP*
nðlnn=  lnnÞ
2h=v:
Two simple examples illustrate this result. In both examples, there are
two countries labeled North ðNÞ and South ðSÞ. The ﬁrst example has
TN > 0 but TS 5 0. The equilibrium in this case entails MP by North in
South but no MP by South in North. Since South has no technologies of
its own, there would be no trade in the counterfactual equilibrium with
no MP; hence,   lNN 5 1.B u tlNN < 1 in the actual equilibrium. This im-
plies that lNN <   lNN; hence, from proposition 2, we see that GMPN
> GMP*
N, so MP is a trade complement for North. This example captures
the gains from BMP for North, which can satisfy domestic demand at
a lower cost by using its superior technologies to produce in South. In
the second example, we have frictionless trade and both regions are
identical except that South is smaller: TN=LN 5 TS=LS and LS < LN.I n
this case, the domestic demand share for South increases as we move
from the counterfactual equilibrium with no MP to the actual equilib-
rium with MP ði.e., lSS >   lSSÞ. This implies that GMPS < GMP*
S, so that
MP is a trade substitute for South: As South becomes more productive
thanks to MP, it effectively becomes larger and the gains from trade
decline.
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The symmetric case can be solved analytically, but the basic intuition re-
garding the role of the various parameters carries to the general case
with asymmetric countries. We derive intuitive formulas for the gains
from trade, MP, and openness and then explore the conditions under
which trade ðMPÞ behaves as a substitute or complement for MP ðtradeÞ.
We are also interested in differentiating between the complementarity
that arises from the possibility of doing BMP and the one that arises
from the use of the home country’s input bundle in multinational activ-
ities.
Symmetry entails Li 5 L and Ti 5 T for all i, dnl 5 d, and h
f
nl 5 h
g
nl 5 h
for all l ≠ n. In equilibrium, wages, costs, and prices are equalized across
countries, wn 5 w, and P
s
n 5 P
s, for s 5 g, f and all n. Thus, the cost of
the multinational input bundle collapses to c
g
li 5 m   c
g for all l ≠ i, with
m ; ½ð1 2 aÞh
12y1 ad
12y 
1=ð12yÞ, and c
g
ll 5 c
g for all l. The share of expen-
ditures on the home input bundle done by MP is simply q 5 aðd=mÞ
12y.
The equilibrium is characterized as follows ðsee App. A for formal
derivationsÞ. In the case of ﬁnal goods, the situation is straightforward: A
country uses some of its own technologies to serve domestic consumers
through local production and also to serve foreign consumers through
MP. For intermediate goods, there is trade, MP, and BMP: Countries use
some of their own technologies to produce at home to serve domestic
and foreign consumers ðthrough exportsÞ, and they use some of their
technologies for MP whose output is sold to local consumers ðMPÞ, sent
back home, or sold to third markets ðBMPÞ.
20 There is also trade asso-
ciated with the import of the home country’s input bundle for MP.
The following proposition shows how access to foreign technologies
through trade and MP increases a country’s real wage.
Proposition 3. Under symmetry,
GO 5 ½1 1 ðI 2 1Þh
2v 
1=v½D0 1 ðI 2 1ÞD1 
h=v; ð18Þ
GT 5
GO
limd→` GO
5

D0 1 ðI 2 1ÞD1
1 1 ðI 2 1Þ~ m2v
h=v
; ð19Þ
GMP 5
GO
limh→` GO
5 ½1 1 ðI 2 1Þh
2v 
1=v

D0 1 ðI 2 1ÞD1
1 1 ðI 2 1Þd2v
h=v
; ð20Þ
20 The assumption that technologies are draws from a multivariate Fre ´chet distribution
with r ∈ ½0; 1Þ implies that there is some BMP even with symmetric countries; BMP vanishes
only when r → 1.
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D0 ; ½1 1 ðI 2 1ÞðmdÞ
2~ v 
12r;
D1 ; ½d
2~ v1 m
2~ v1 ðI 2 2ÞðmdÞ
2~ v 
12r;
~ m ; lim
d→` m 5 ð1 2 aÞ
1=ð12yÞh;
~ v ; v=ð1 2 rÞ:
The expression for the gains from openness in equation ð18Þ indicates
that a country that opens up to both trade and MP in the intermediate-
goods sector beneﬁts from using its own technologies abroad and from
access to foreign technologies. When domestic technologies are used
ðthe term D0Þ, production can be carried out in I 2 1 foreign locations
through MP at the cost m and then goods shipped back home at the
cost d. Hence, technologies are “fully” discounted by ðmdÞ
2~ v. Foreign
technologies can be accessed by importing goods, in which case they are
discounted by d
2~ v ðthe ﬁrst term in D1Þ; by doing MP, in which case they
are discounted by m
2~ v ðthe second term in D1Þ; and by doing BMP in
I 2 2 different locations, in which case the full discount ðmdÞ
2~ v applies
ðthe third term in D1Þ. The term in the ﬁrst brackets in equation ð18Þ
captures the gains from accessing I 2 1 foreign technologies through
ðinwardÞ MP in the ﬁnal-goods sector, at a discount of h
2v.
Itisclear that the gains from openness decrease with h as well as d:The
higher the trade or MP costs, the lower the gains from openness. Addi-
tionally, the parameter r appears in GO in association with intermediate
goods: As r indicates the correlation between technology draws for a
given source country across different production locations, it matters
only when both trade and MP are allowed. As one would expect, GO
decreases with r. In the case in which r → 1 ðso that z
s
li 5 z
s
ji for all l, j
and s 5 g, f Þ, BMP in intermediate goods vanishes, and trade and MP
no longer overlap: If d > h, there is MP but no arm’s-length trade; in
contrast, if h > d, there is arm’s-length trade but no MP ðsee App. AÞ.
The expression for GT in equation ð19Þ indicates that a country that
opens up to trade beneﬁts through specialization according to Ricardian
comparative advantage ðwhich, here, takes into account trade ﬂows as-
sociated with BMPÞ and from the fact that trade facilitates MP by allow-
ing multinational afﬁliates to import inputs from their home country.
The following proposition describes parameter conﬁgurations under
which trade is an MP complement or an MP substitute.
Proposition 4. Assume that countries are symmetric. ðaÞ If r 5 0
and a > 0, trade is an MP complement; if r > 0 and a 5 0, trade is an MP
substitute. ðbÞ Assume that a, r > 0.I fy → 1, trade is an MP complement;
if h < d and y → `, trade is an MP substitute.
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r 5 0, for which we know from proposition 1 that trade is MP indepen-
dent. As r increases above zero, the positive correlation between pro-
ductivity draws across locations generates substitutability. Alternatively,
as a increases above zero, the demand for home country inputs by multi-
nationals introduces complementarity. If both r > 0 and a > 0, then we
need to consider the parameter y.I fy is close to one, the low elasticity
of substitution between home and host countries’ inputs for MP gen-
erates no gains from MP if trade is not possible. Hence, trade is an MP
complement. Conversely, if y is high, then only the cheapest input bun-
dle is used for MP; if h < d, then trade does not contribute to decreasing
MP costs. This implies that trade is an MP substitute.
Turning to the gains from MP, the ﬁrst term on the right-hand side of
ð20Þ captures the gains associated with ﬁnal goods, whereas the second
term captures the gains associated with intermediate goods. For inter-
mediates, the gains from MP are affected by the substitutability between
trade and MP that arises for r > 0.
Proposition 5. Assume that countries are symmetric. If r 5 0,M Pi s
trade independent; if r > 0, MP is a trade substitute.
We emphasize two implications of this proposition. First, the value of
a does not affect whether MP is trade independent or is a trade substi-
tute. The reason is that while trade facilitates MP by reducing the unit
cost of the multinational input bundle ðm < ~ m if a > 0Þ, MP does not
facilitate trade; MP only adds a competing alternative to trade in serving
other markets. Second, the result that MP is trade independent for r 5
0 is consistent with lemma 2: Under symmetry, we have   lnn 5 lnn be-
cause, in this case, MP affects all countries equally and therefore has no
effect on trade shares.
3. Two Countries with a 5 0 and Frictionless Trade
This special case shows that the rich country can experience losses from
MP. We consider two countries labeled North ðNÞ and South ðSÞ, with
TN=LN > TS=LS. This condition implies that wages will tend to be higher
in North than in South. We assume that MP generates no demand for
home country intermediate goods ða 5 0Þ and that trade is frictionless
ðdNS 5 dSN 5 1Þ. Our main result for this case is established in the fol-
lowing proposition.
Proposition 6. Assume a 5 0 and frictionless trade. There exists
r*∈ ½0; 1Þ such that North gains from frictionless MP in intermediate
goods ðGMP
g
N > 1Þ for r ∈ ½0; r*Þ, while it loses for r ∈ ðr*; 1Þð GMP
g
N < 1Þ.
The reason why MP can have a negative impact on the rich country is
that outward MP effectively reduces the demand for a country’s exports,
worsening its terms of trade. But this negative effect relies on there be-
ing strong substitutability between trade and MP as alternative ways of
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eter r for this to be a dominant effect. Note that in this example, we have
assumed a 5 0. But in general, with a > 0, outward MP would generate
an increased demand for home country inputs, and this would make it
less likely for the rich country to lose from MP ðsee Becker and Muendler
2010; Irarrazabal et al. 2013Þ.
21
III. Calibration
A. Data Description
We restrict our analysis to the set of 19 OECD countries considered by
Eaton and Kortum ð2002Þ: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Den-
mark, Spain, Finland, France, United Kingdom, Germany, Greece, Italy,
Japan, Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Portugal, Sweden, and the
United States. Except when mentioned otherwise, all the data are aver-
aged over the period 1996–2001. We use STAN data on manufacturing
trade ﬂows from country l to country n as the empirical counterpart for
trade in intermediates in the model, Xnl. We use UNCTAD data on the
gross value of production for multinational afﬁliates from i in l as the
empirical counterpart of bilateral MP ﬂows in the model, Yli ; Y
f
li 1 Y
g
li.
22
Wecomplementthe bilateral-trade andMPdata withdata onintraﬁrm
trade by multinational ﬁrms in manufacturing, and the share of MP in
ﬁnal goods, relative to all MP. These data are available for the United
States from the BEA. We also use data from the BEA to compute a mea-
sure of BMP for foreign afﬁliates of US multinationals and for US afﬁli-
ates of foreign multinationals in the manufacturing sector. Appendix B
presents more detail on the data and summary statistics.
B. Calibration Procedure
We reduce the number of parameters to calibrate by assuming that
bilateral-trade and MP costs in the intermediate-goods sector are a func-
tion of distance and whether countries share a border and a language,
21 It is also important to note that in our model, outward MP generates no proﬁts since
there is perfect competition. Such proﬁts would lead to additional gains from MP for rich
countries, as in Burstein and Monge-Naranjo ð2009Þ and Arkolakis et al. ð2012Þ.
22 Since the model is one of constant returns to scale and perfect competition, the
conceptof “ﬁrms”is notclearlydeﬁned. Thereis, thus,a gapbetweenmodelanddatasince
thedataon MP comefromthe activitiesof multinationalﬁrms.Onthe onehand,thisis not
a major problem because we use only aggregate MP ﬂows rather than any ﬁrm-level data.
On the other hand, as we acknowledge in the introduction, there is a discrepancy between
the concept of MP in the model, which corresponds to the value of production with
technologies from country i in another country l, and the concept of MP in the data, which
corresponds to the value of production in country l performed by afﬁliates of ﬁrms
headquartered in country i.
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dni 5 1 1 ðd
d
0 1 d
d
distdistniÞ   ðd
d
bordÞ
bni   ðd
d
langÞ
lni; ð21Þ
h
g
ni 5 1 1 ðd
h
0 1 d
h
distdistniÞ   ðd
h
bordÞ
bni   ðd
h
langÞ
lni; ð22Þ
for all n ≠ i, with dnn 5 1 and h
g
nn 5 1. The variable distni is the distance
between i and n. The variable bni ðlniÞ equals one if countries share a
border ða languageÞ and zero otherwise. Thus, for example, if d
d
bord < 1,
then countries that share a border have lower trade costs. We also as-
sume that MP costs in the ﬁnal-goods sector are proportional to the ones
in the intermediate-goods sector:
h
f
ni 5 max½1; mh
g
ni : ð23Þ
Finally, we assume that Ti=Li varies directly with the share of R&D
employment observed in the data ðan average over the 1990s from the
World Development IndicatorsÞ. Thus, for example, since the share
of R&D employment is 0.9 percent in the United States and 0.3 per-
cent in Greece, we assume that Ti=Li is three times higher in the United
States than in Greece.
The parameters that need to be calibrated, then, are the parameters
that determine trade and MP costs in the tradable sector, U ;
fd
d
0; d
h
0; d
d
dist; d
h
dist; d
d
bord; d
h
bord; d
d
lang; d
h
langg;theparameterminequationð23Þ;
the size parameters, L ; ðL1; L2;: : : ;LIÞ; the Fre ´chet parameters, r and
v; and the remaining technology parameters ½a, b, y, a .
We calibrate ½a, b, y  as follows. We set the labor share in the
intermediate-goods sector, b, to 0.5 and the labor share in the ﬁnal-
goods sector, a, to 0.75, as calibrated by Alvarez and Lucas ð2007Þ.
23 This
implies that h ; ð1 2 aÞ=b 5 0:5. For the parameter y, which captures
thedegreeofcomplementaritybetweenhomeandhostcountries’inputs
for MP, we appeal to estimates from the labor literature. Becker and
Muendler ð2010Þ estimate cross-wage elasticities of labor demand for Ger-
man multinationals across multiple production locations. Their results
suggest a value of approximately y 5 1:5.
24
23 They calibrate the parameter b to match the share of value added in gross output in
tradable sectors ðagriculture, mining, and manufacturingÞ and the parameter a to match
the fraction of US employment in the nontradable sector ðservicesÞ, using input-output
data for the OECD countries in 1993. Jones ð2011Þ also uses b 5 0:5.
24 They estimate that the effect of a 1 percent increase in German wages on the demand
for labor by multinationals in other countries of Western Europe is 1.2. Since the average
share of these multinationals’ wage bill allocated to German workers is 62 percent, the
implied elasticity of substitution is 1.94. They also estimate that the elasticity of German
multinationals’ labor demand in Germany to wages in Western Europe is 0.2. Given that
the average share of these multinationals’ wage bill allocated to Western European workers
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All use subject to JSTOR Terms and ConditionsWe choose not to include the parameter r in the calibration since this
parameter is not well identiﬁed from the aggregate data on bilateral
trade and MP shares. Instead, we consider two values for r: r 5 0 ðno
correlationÞ and a central value of r 5 0:5.
We calibrate the remaining parameters through the following algo-
rithm. Given a value for r ∈ f0; 0:5g, the values for ½a, b, y  as chosen
above, and a set of parameters to calibrate ½U, L, a, m, v , we compute the
equilibrium and generate the following statistics: a simulated data set
with 361 observations ðone for each country pair, including the domes-
tic pairsÞ for the bilateral trade and MP shares, l
T
nl ; Xnl=ojXnj and
l
M
nl ; Yli=ojYlj, respectively; real GDP levels for all countries, wnLn=P
f
n;
intraﬁrm trade to MP ratios, qliY
g
li=Yli; and MP in the intermediate-
goods sector as a share of total MP, Y
g
li=Yli. We compute averages of the
last two variables across country pairs in which the United States is ei-
ther the home or the host country ði.e., i 5 US or l 5 USÞ. We also com-
pute an estimate of the trade elasticity ði.e., the partial elasticity of trade
ﬂows to trade costsÞ by running an ordinary least squares ðOLSÞ regres-
sion with no intercept on the following gravity equation for normalized
trade ﬂows, similar to Eaton and Kortum ð2002Þ:
log
l
T
nl
l
T
ll
52 εlog

dnlP
g
l
P
g
n

: ð24Þ
Notice that for r 5 a 5 0, this equation is the same as the one in equa-
tion ð14Þ and ε 5 v. Otherwise, in general, ε ≠ v, as we explain in more
detail below.
Finally, we compute a measure of the explanatory power of the model
for bilateral trade shares given by
R
T ; 1 2 on;i;n ≠ iðl
T;data
ni 2 l
T;model
ni Þ
2
on;i;n ≠ iðl
T;data
ni Þ
2 : ð25Þ
We use an analogous formula for the measure of the explanatory power
of the model for bilateral MP shares, which we denote by R
M.
This procedure gives us a set of moments that we use to calibrate the
parameters ½U, L, a, m, v  as follows. First, given U and v, the parameters a
and m are chosen so that the model matches the moments for the im-
portance of intraﬁrm trade and MP in intermediate goods, respectively,
and the vector L matches the real GDP levels ðrelative to the US levelsÞ
in the data. Second, given v, the parameters in U are chosen to minimize
ð1 2 R
TÞ 1 ð1 2 R
MÞ. Finally, the parameter v is chosen so that the value
is 15 percent, the implied elasticity of substitution is 1.3. The average of these two elas-
ticities is close to 1.5. This is close to the elasticity of substitution between skilled and
unskilled workers, which Katz and Murphy ð1992Þ estimate at 1.4.
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All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditionsfor ε above is equal to 4.2, an average of the estimates presented by
Simonovska and Waugh ð2011Þ for the set of 19 OECD countries that we
consider here.
25
C. Results
Table 1 reports the calibrated parameters, and the vector L is reported
in Appendix table C2.
For both calibrations, the effect of distance on trade and MP costs is
similar: A 10 percent increase in distance between a country pair in-
creases trade costs by more than 2 percent and MP costs in the tradable-
goods sector by more than 3 percent. Both calibrations suggest that a
common border decreases trade costs by more than MP costs ðd
d
border
< d
h
borderÞ, whereas the opposite is true for country pairs with a common
language ðd
d
lang > d
h
langÞ. These calibrated parameters translate into aver-
age MP costs in the tradable sector that are more than 40 percent higher
than the average trade costs for the calibration with r 5 0.
We showed in Section II.C that, in general, the trade elasticity is not
equal to v because of the existence of intraﬁrm trade ða > 0Þ and the
fact that r might be different from zero. In fact, our calibration proce-
dure for the case with r 5 0:5 implies that, to generate a trade elasticity
of ε 5 4:2, we need v 5 3:75. This reveals that the trade elasticity is a
biased estimator of v. The ðupwardÞ bias arises because r > 0 leads to a
higher trade elasticity than v, as now there is an additional channel ðbe-
sides the standard one in Ricardian trade-only modelsÞ through which
higher trade costs decrease trade ﬂows; that is, exports can be replaced
by MP or BMP. As expected, for the case with r 5 0, the calibrated value
of v is 4.45, which is closer to the value of the trade elasticity ε.O f
course, if a 5 r 5 0, then v 5 ε 5 4:2.
The next two tables illustrate how the calibrated model matches the
patterns in the data along several dimensions. Table 2 reports statistics
from the data and the calibrated model. For bilateral trade and MP
shares, we report the mean, the standard deviation, and the correlation
coefﬁcient. We also show the average BMP share implied by the model
for foreign afﬁliates of US multinationals and for US afﬁliates of for-
eign multinationals. While the average bilateral trade and MP shares
generated by the model are similar to the ones in the data, the correla-
tion between the two ﬂows is higher in the model. We comment on the
results for BMP below.
Table 3 shows the measure of the model’s explanatory power for bilat-
eral trade and MP, R
T and R
M, respectively. Additionally, it presents cor-
25 Various empirical studies using different estimation strategies ﬁnd a value for ε in the
range of the one calculated by Simonovska and Waugh ð2011Þ. See Bernard et al. ð2003Þ,
Donaldson ð2010Þ, Simonovska ð2010Þ, Eaton et al. ð2011Þ, and Burstein and Vogel ð2012Þ.
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and MP shares across country pairs, as well as correlations for aggregate
exports, imports, outward MP, and inward MP as shares of GDP of the
source and the receiving country, respectively.
BothR
2’sandcorrelationcoefﬁcientsforbilateraltradeandMPshares
are high, indicating that the model captures the observed bilateral pat-
terns of these two ﬂows fairly well. When we express total exports and
total imports as shares of absorption in manufacturing, the correlations
between the model and data are still high. Correlations are lower but
fairly strong when we compute total outward and inward MP as shares of
GDP. The model performs poorly in capturing the level of outward and
inward MP shares for the largest countries in the sample ði.e., Germany,
Japan, and the United StatesÞ. Appendix table C2 shows the actual and
simulated data for these four variables for each country against country
size.
TABLE 1
Calibrated Parameters
Model with
r 5 0:5
Model with
r 5 0
Trade MP Trade MP
Cost parameters:
Distance .18 .26 .13 .31
Common border .74 1.45 .65 1.86
Common language .60 .40 .70 .36
Constant .89 .95 1.09 1.30
Average costs 2.88 3.39 2.79 4.03
Standard deviation costs .40 .47 .32 .48
Minimum cost 1.41 1.47 1.51 1.56
Maximum cost 5.49 7.12 4.69 8.45
Intraﬁrm trade parameter a .15 .14
MP cost parameter for ﬁnal sector m 1.55 1.11
Variability parameter in Fre ´chet v 3.75 4.40
TABLE 2
Summary Statistics: Data and Calibrated Model
Data
Model with
r 5 0:5
Model with
r 5 0
Bilateral trade shares:
Average .021 .021 .021
Standard deviation .038 .035 .035
Bilateral MP shares:
Average .029 .024 .023
Standard deviation .063 .038 .041
Correlation bilateral trade and MP shares .701 .804 .793
Average outward BMP shares for the United States .405 .115 .364
Average inward BMP shares for the United States .090 .013 .065
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country l ≠ i and sells to country n ≠ l. Let kli ; ðon ≠lp
g
nliX
g
nÞ=Y
g
li denote
the share of total production of intermediate goods in l by country i
that is sold in countries other than l. ðNote that kll is the export share
of domestic ﬁrms in country l.Þ Using BEA data for the manufacturing
sector, we can construct BMP shares kli for the pairs ðl, iÞ in which either
i 5 US or l 5 US. We refer to the average kli, for i 5 US ðl 5 USÞ, as the
average outward ðinwardÞ BMP share for the United States.
In table 2 we show that the model is reassuringly consistent with the
data in the sense that the average outward BMP share for the United
States is much higher than its average inward BMP share. This is what
we would expect since the United States is the largest country in our sam-
ple and has the ðsecond-Þ highest research intensity ðsee App. table C2Þ,
discouraging the use of the United States as an export platform.
On the one hand, the calibrated model with r 5 0 implies an average
outward BMP share for the United States of 36 percent, which is not far
from the 40 percent share shown in the data. On the other hand, the
calibrated model with r 5 0:5 implies an average outward BMP share for
the United States of only 11.5 percent. One way to understand why the
model calibrated with r 5 0:5 does poorly in replicating the observed
BMP shares is by recalling the result in Section II.E that in a symmetric
world, BMP ﬂows go to zero as r → 1. The reason is that in a symmetric
world with perfectly correlated productivity draws, for country i to serve
market n through l implies paying both the MP cost and the trade cost
ðuniform across all country pairs by assumptionÞ, whereas exporting en-
tails only the trade cost. In principle, moving to an asymmetric world
could lead to positive BMP ﬂows even with r → 1, as cheaper countries
TABLE 3
Model’s Goodness of Fit
Model with
r 5 0:5
Model with
r 5 0
Model’s R
2:
Bilateral trade shares .89 .89
Bilateral MP shares .64 .66
Correlations data and model:
Bilateral trade shares .93 .92
Bilateral MP shares .76 .77
Total exports shares .76 .71
Total imports shares .85 .85
Total outward MP shares .56 .54
Total inward MP shares .56 .60
Note.—Bilateral MP is the gross value of production for afﬁliates from country i in l;
total outward MP is the total gross value of production for foreign afﬁliates from country i;
totalinwardMP is thetotal grossvalue of productionfor foreignafﬁliatesincountry l. Total
exports and imports are expressed as shares of absorption in manufacturing.
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our sample of developed countries.
26 In contrast, a low value for r leads
to more BMP because it implies that country i may have a particularly
good productivity draw in l but not in n;s oi fl and n are “close” ði.e.,
dnl is lowÞ, then it would be efﬁcient to use l as an export platform to
serve n.
Figure 2 shows outward BMP shares for the United States in country
l ðkl;USÞ on the horizontal axis and export shares from country l on the
vertical axis, in the data and as implied by the calibrated models with
r 5 0 and r 5 0:5, respectively.
27 The left panel of ﬁgure 2 shows a strong
positive relationship between BMP and export shares in the data: An
OLS regression with no intercept and robust standard errors yields a
coefﬁcient of 0.88 ðstandard error 0.05Þ and R
2 of .95. Countries that
deviate from this pattern are small economies, such as Belgium, which
has a relatively high export share ð95 percentÞ but a lower BMP share
than the United States ð60 percentÞ, and Sweden, with a BMP share rel-
atively higher than the United States ð64 percentÞ but a lower export
share ð50 percentÞ. The middle panel of ﬁgure 2 shows that, according
to the model calibrated with r 5 0, BMP and export shares are closely
lined up over the 45-degree line.
28 This means that the export intensity
of multinationals is close to that of domestic ﬁrms; for example, the
export share of US ﬁrms in Belgium is close to that of domestic Belgian
ﬁrms. The right panel of ﬁgure 2 shows that the model calibrated with
r 5 0:5 also reproduces the positive relationship between US outward
BMP shares and export shares but with BMP shares that are too small.
Turning to inward BMP shares, the average BMP share for the United
States is 9 percent as reported in table 2, and the export share from the
United States is also close to 9 percent. The calibrated model with r 5 0
delivers an average BMP share of 6.5 percent, while the export share
from the United States is 7 percent. In contrast, the calibrated model with
r 5 0:5 delivers much lower average BMP shares ð1.3 percentÞ, but not
very different export shares for the United States ð8 percentÞ.
These results reveal that the model calibrated with r 5 0 does much
better in matching the facts about BMP than the model calibrated with
r 5 0:5. Still, we choose to present results for both calibrations below to
26 The introduction of asymmetric trade costs could make it proﬁtable for the United
States to serve country n through some country l that is “close” to n ðe.g., the United States
could serve France through BelgiumÞ. But our calibrated model implies that in most cases,
it would make more sense to serve country n directly through MP rather than through
some other country l.
27 Country l’s total exports in manufacturing are normalized by the total gross value of
production in manufacturing in country l.
28 Notice that if a 5 r 5 0, then kli 5 kll for all i, l. Since kli 5on≠lp
g
nliXn=onp
g
nliXn, plug-
ging in for p
g
nli from eq. ð7Þ with a 5 0 and r 5 0, kli 5on≠ld
2v
nl P
v
nXn=ond
2v
nl P
v
nXn, so that
kli 5 klj for all i, j.
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and MP implied by the model.
IV. Gains from Trade, MP, and Openness
A. Gains under Independence
Before we present the implications of our calibrated model for the mea-
surement of the gains from trade, MP, and openness, it is instructive
to compute these gains under the special case with a 5 r 5 0. We refer
to these gains as the gains under independence because, as shown in
proposition 1, a 5 r 5 0 implies that trade is MP independent in the
sense that the gains from trade are equal to the gains computed in a
trade-only model ði.e., GTn 5 GT*
nÞ and that the gains from openness
are simply GO*
n ; GT*
n   GMP*
n ðrecall that GMP*
n are the gains from MP
computed in an MP-only modelÞ. As shown in lemma 1, GT*
n and GMP*
n
canbecomputed directlyusing thedata on bilateral trade andMPshares
and a value for the parameters h and v. The parameter h is easily cali-
bratedðseeaboveÞ,whilefora 5 r 5 0, the parameter v can be recovered
FIG.2 . —BMP shares: data and calibrated model, the United States. Outward bridge
multinational production ðBMPÞ shares from the United States to country l against export
share from country l to all countries, in manufacturing.
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the results for GT*
n are consistent with the formula in Arkolakis, Costi-
not, and Rodrı ´guez-Clare ð2012Þ as a general result for a class of quan-
titative trade models. We calculate GT*
n using the data in Appendix ta-
ble C4. For GMP*
n, we use the data on inward MP shares in table C3, and
we assume that the share of MP in the intermediate-goods sector in
each country is 0.5, as the one observed for the United States. With this
assumption and h 5 0:5, GMP
g
n 5 ½1 2oi≠nYni=ðwnLnÞ 
2h=v and GMP
f
n 5
½1 2 ð1=2Þoi≠nYni=ðwnLnÞ 
21=v.
Table 4 shows the gains from openness, the gains from trade, and the
gains from MP, under independence, calculated directly using the data
and the parameters h 5 0:5 and v 5 4:2. Table 4 presents the results for
a subsample of countries, and table C5 shows results for all countries in
our sample.
On average, the gains from openness are almost three times as large
as the gains from trade ð17 vs. 6.6 percentÞ. For countries with high in-
ward MP shares, such as Portugal and New Zealand, the gains from open-
ness are around ﬁve times as large as the gains from trade.
B. Gains in the Calibrated Model
The calculations under independence shown above miss the potential
gains coming from the interactions between trade and MP. In this sub-
section, we use our calibrated model to explore the effect of such in-
teractions.
We show results averaged across countries in table 5 and results by
country, for a subset of countries, in table 6. Results by country for the
entire sample, for r 5 0 and r 5 0:5, respectively, are in Appendix ta-
bles C6 and C7. For meaningful comparisons between GTn and GT*
n
and between GMPn and GMP*
n, the variables GT*
n and GMP*
n are calcu-
TABLE 4
Gains from Openness, Trade, and Multinational Production: Independence
GO*
n GT*
n GMP*
n Ln
New Zealand 1.365 1.053 1.296 .7
Denmark 1.137 1.096 1.037 1.2
Portugal 1.290 1.064 1.213 1.4
Canada 1.261 1.081 1.166 4.4
Germany 1.119 1.037 1.079 9.3
Japan 1.022 1.006 1.015 13.4
United States 1.053 1.015 1.037 28.7
Note.—The variables GO*
n,G T *
n, and GMP*
n refer, respectively, to the gains from open-
ness, trade, and multinational production, for country n, under independence. The vari-
able Ln refers to the number of units of equipped labor in country n, as a percentage of
OECDð19Þ’s total.
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calibrated model.
The implied average gains from openness are between 15 and 22 per-
cent. These gains are more than twice as large as the average gains from
openness coming from a trade-only model, GT*
n 5 6–7 percent, and
around twice as large as the ones coming from an MP-only model, GMP*
n
TABLE 6
Gains from Openness, Trade, and Multinational Production:
Selected Countries
GOn GTn GT*
n GMPn GMP*
n GMP
g
n
Model with r 5 0
New Zealand 1.265 1.080 1.038 1.223 1.238 1.077
Denmark 1.199 1.119 1.097 1.102 1.109 1.042
Portugal 1.230 1.115 1.084 1.141 1.152 1.054
Canada 1.202 1.104 1.075 1.123 1.132 1.048
Germany 1.051 1.040 1.036 1.019 1.016 1.010
Japan 1.004 1.004 1.003 1.001 1.001 1.001
United States 1.012 1.010 1.008 1.005 1.004 1.003
Model with r 5 0:5
New Zealand 1.320 1.100 1.037 1.221 1.262 1.096
Denmark 1.320 1.150 1.112 1.120 1.141 1.032
Portugal 1.384 1.140 1.082 1.192 1.219 1.063
Canada 1.282 1.127 1.090 1.128 1.157 1.046
Germany 1.079 1.056 1.051 1.018 1.026 1.005
Japan 1.007 1.005 1.005 1.001 1.002 1.000
United States 1.016 1.012 1.011 1.002 1.005 1.000
Note.—The variables GOn,G T n, GMPn, and GMP
g
n refer, respectively, to the gains from
openness,trade,multinationalproduction,andmultinationalproductionintheintermediate-
good sector, for country n;G T *
n and GMP*
n refer to the gains from trade and multinational
production, respectively, from trade-only and MP-only models.
TABLE 5
Gains from Openness, Trade, and Multinational Production: Average
Average GOn GTn GT*
n GMPn GMP*
n
Model with r 5 0
All sectors 1.148 1.080 1.062 1.086 1.091
Intermediate-goods sector 1.092 1.080 1.062 1.034 1.039
Final-goods sector 1.049 ... ... 1.049 1.049
Model with r 5 0:5
All sectors 1.221 1.101 1.074 1.095 1.116
Intermediate-goods sector 1.148 1.101 1.074 1.032 1.051
Final-goods sector 1.061 ... ... 1.061 1.061
Note.—The variables GOn,G T n, and GMPn refer, respectively, to the gains from open-
ness, trade, and multinational production, for country n;G T *
n and GMP*
n refer to the gains
fromtradeandmultinationalproduction,respectively,fromtrade-onlyandMP-onlymodels.
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openness are from trade and MP in the intermediate-goods sector.
The calibrated model implies that trade is an MP complement since,
on average, GTn > GT*
n. Adding trade enhances MP by facilitating in-
traﬁrm trade and reducing the unit costs of MP: The average unit cost of
the multinational input bundle decreases by around 50 percent with re-
spect to the scenario with only MP but no trade, using either version of
the calibrated model.
Turning to MP, the calibrated model implies that, on average, MP is a
trade substitute since GMPn < GMP*
n when r 5 0:5. The substitutability
is quite weak when we consider lower values of r. In fact, for r 5 0,M P
is practicallytrade independent. As suggested by the analytical results un-
der symmetry in proposition 5, the complementarity forces associated
with BMP cannot overcome the substitutability arising from the fact that
MP adds a competing alternative to trade in serving foreign markets.
Theseresultsimplythatwhiletrade-onlymodelstendtounderestimate
the gains from trade by a signiﬁcant amount, MP-only models tend to
overestimate the gains from MP by a small amount. Another interesting
result isthat the gains from trade are larger than the gains from MP in the
intermediate-goods sector. This implies that, starting at the actual equi-
librium, removing the possibility of trade in intermediate goods would
generate larger losses than removing the possibility of MP in this sector.
Not surprisingly, as shown in table 6, the gains from openness are
larger for smaller countries: The correlation coefﬁcient between Ln and
GOn is around 2.64 for both calibrations. Trade behaves as an MP com-
plement, GTn > GT*
n, for all countries. MP behaves as a mild trade sub-
stitute, GMPn ≤ GMP*
n, except for Germany and the United States when
r 5 0, in which case MP behaves as a trade complement.
29 For a small
country such as Canada, for which the model captures ðinwardÞ trade
and MP ﬂows very well ðsee tables C3 and C4Þ, the gains from openness
are between 20 and 28 percent. This is much larger than the gains calcu-
lated using a trade-only model and larger than the ones calculated using
an MP-only model. The gains from trade for Canada are around 30 per-
cent higher than those calculated with a trade-only model ðwith r 5 0:5,
GTCAN 5 12:7 percent and GT*
CAN 5 9 percentÞ, whereas the gains from
MP are lower than those calculated with an MP-only model ðwith r 5 0:5,
GMPCAN 5 12:8 percent and GMP*
CAN 5 15:7 percentÞ.
More generally, the gap between GTn and GT*
n is increasing in the
amount of inward MP ðas a share of GDPÞ in the calibrated model, across
countries. Figure 3 illustrates this relationship. For example, countries
29 On the basis of proposition 2 and the discussion of that proposition in Sec. II.E, this
resultcan beunderstood bynoting that boththe UnitedStates andGermanyhave largenet
outward MP ﬂows, implying large gains from BMP.
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arearound3percentagepointslargerthanintrade-onlymodels,whereas
this gap falls to 1 percentage point for countries with inward MP ﬂows
near 15 percent.
It is noteworthy that Japan and the United States, the two largest coun-
tries in our sample, have extremely low gains from MP. In fact, if we re-
strict our attention to the gains from MP in the intermediate-goods sec-
tor and the calibration with r 5 0:5, the United States gains virtually zero
from MP ðGMP
g
n 5 1Þ. By doing outward MP, the United States reallo-
cates production from home to foreign countries, in effect sharing its su-
perior technologies with the rest of the world and worsening its terms of
trade ðsee proposition 6Þ. In principle, as explained in Section II.E, there
are three forces that could counteract this negative effect: ﬁrst, gains
from inward MP, second, gains from BMP, and, third, increased demand
for home production of inputs by foreign afﬁliates of multinational ﬁrms.
In the calibrated model, these forces are just strong enough to offset the
negative terms of trade effect. It is important to caution, however, that
the calibrated model fails to generate the high inward MP ﬂows observed
inthedataforthelargestcountriesinoursample.Hence,ourmeasuresof
the gains from MP for these countries are signiﬁcantly underestimated.
FIG.3 . —Inward multinational production and complementarity. The expression GT
2 GT* refers to the difference between the gains from trade calculated from the calibrated
model with r 5 0 and the gains from trade calculated from a trade-only model.
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n calculated with the observed
data ðin table 4Þ and with simulated data ðin table 6Þ: While GMP*
US
calculated from the data is 3.7 percent, the model’s calibration delivers
around 0.2–0.5 percent ðsee table C3Þ.
Finally,itisinterestingtoexplorehowtradeandMPcostsaffectacoun-
try’s real income level. We focus on New Zealand, a small and relatively
isolatedcountry:ItsaverageinwardtradeðMPÞcostsare4.67ð5.78Þversus
an average of 2.9 ð3.4Þ for all countries in our sample. We use the cali-
brated model to quantify the effect on New Zealand if its bilateral in-
ward and outward trade and MP costs became equal to those of Canada
or Belgium, two “centrally” located countries. We compute the percent-
age change in the real wage for New Zealand of moving from the equilib-
rium in the calibrated model to one of three counterfactual scenarios:
ð1Þ a situation in which the trade costs equal those of Canada or Belgium,
ð2Þ a situation in which the MP costs equal those of Canada or Belgium,
and ð3Þ a situation in which both the trade and MP costs equal those of
Canada or Belgium.
The potential gains for New Zealand of having its bilateral trade and
MP costs decline to the levels prevailing in Canada or Belgium are very
large. Table 7 shows that if trade costs were changed to the level of Can-
ada, New Zealand’s real wage would increase by 30 percent, while doing
the same for MP costs would increase its real wage by 70 percent. The
gains of simultaneously changing trade and MP costs to Canadian lev-
els would increase the real wage in New Zealand by 119 percent. These
gains for New Zealand would come mainly from having cheaper access
to US technologies through MP in both tradable and nontradable goods.
Table 7 shows that New Zealand also would experience signiﬁcant gains
if its trade and MP costs declined to the levels prevailing in Belgium, but
not as much as if they declined to the levels prevailing in Canada. Over-
all, the gains computed in this experiment are quite large compared to
TABLE 7
Gains from Openness, Trade, and Multinational Production: New Zealand
Percentage Change in Real
Wage: New Zealand’s
Iceberg-Type Costs as in
Canada Belgium
Trade 30 39
Multinational production 70 55
Trade and multinational production 119 75
Note.—Calculation using calibrated model with r 5 0. Change in real wage for New
Zealand of moving from the calibrated level of trade and MP costs to a situation in which
ð1Þ trade costs equal the ones calibrated for Canada ðBelgiumÞ, ð2Þ MP costs equal the ones
calibrated for Canada ðBelgiumÞ, and ð3Þ both trade and MP costs equal the ones cali-
brated for Canada ðBelgiumÞ.
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All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditionsthe gains from trade and MP for New Zealand in table 6. This result is
consistent with Eaton and Kortum’s ð2002Þ and Waugh’s ð2010Þ ﬁndings
thatthegainsfromtraderelativetoautarkyaresmallrelativetothegainsof
removing existing trade costs toward a frictionless world.
V. Conclusion
It is reasonable to think that countries, specially small ones, beneﬁt
greatly from their interaction with the rest of the world. Whereas much
attention has been devoted to trade as the main channel for such bene-
ﬁts, we argue in this paper for the need to investigate other channels as
well. We have taken a step in this direction by developing and calibrating
a multicountry general equilibrium Ricardian model of trade and MP.
An important consideration in building this model has been to allow for
both the forces that make trade and MP substitutes and the forces that
make them complements, as the empirical evidence suggests. The calibra-
tionreveals that the gains from openness are much higher than the gains
fromtradeandalsohigherthanthegainsfromMP.Onnet,tradebehaves
as a complement to MP, while MP behaves as a mild substitute for trade.
Asa result, for countries with large inward MP ﬂows, the gains from trade
can be much higher than those calculated in models with only trade. For
example, the gains from trade implied by our model for New Zealand
are between 8 and 10 percent, whereas trade-only models imply gains of
around 4 percent. The reason is that our model captures the indirect
gains from trade associated with its role in facilitating MP. In contrast,
the gains from MP calculated in our calibrated model are slightly lower
than the gains computed in MP-only models. The reason is that in our
model, the substitutability forces associated with the fact that trade and
MP are competing ways of serving a foreign market dominate the com-
plementarity forces created by BMP.
Appendix A
Proofs and Other Results
Expenditure Shares and Price Indices
We show that some important results from Eaton and Kortum ð2002Þ can be
applied to our setup. In particular, we derive expressions for the expenditure
share in country n devoted to goods produced with technologies from country i
and the CES price indices in country n, for both ﬁnal and intermediate goods.
This will prove the results in equations ð6Þ, ð7Þ, and ð8Þ.
Since ﬁnal goods are identical ði.e., they enter preferences symmetricallyÞ
except for their productivity parameters, we follow Alvarez and Lucas ð2007Þ
and drop index u, labeling ﬁnal goods by Z
f ; ðz
f
1; :::; z
f
IÞ. Similarly, we label
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g ; ðz
g
1; :::; z
g
IÞ. In a competitive equilibrium, prices are
p
f
nðZ
fÞ 5 mini c
f
ni=z
f
ni and p
g
nðZ
gÞ 5 mini;l c
g
lidnl=z
g
li.
Consider, ﬁrst, the case of intermediate goods and let p
g
ni ; minl c
g
lidnl=z
g
li.T h e
probability that p
g
ni is lower than p is
G
g
niðpÞ 5 1 2 Prðz
g
li ≤ c
g
lidnl=p for all lÞ:
Under the assumption that z
g
li are draws from the multivariate Fre ´chet distribu-
tion in equation ð5Þ, we have
G
g
niðpÞ 5 1 2 exp

2Ti

o
l
ðc
g
lidnl=pÞ
2v=ð12rÞ
12r
5 1 2 exp½2Tið~ c
g
niÞ
2vp
v ;
where ~ c
g
ni ; ½olðc
g
lidnlÞ
2v=ð12rÞ 
2ð12rÞ=v. Since p
g
ni is independent across i, the reason-
ing in Eaton and Kortum ð2002Þ can be immediately applied to show that country
n will buy goods produced with country i’s technologies for a measure of goods
equal to Tið~ c
g
niÞ
2v=ojTjð~ c
g
njÞ
2v.
Of the goods purchased by country n that are produced with country i tech-
nologies, what share is produced in country l? This is equal to the probability
that, for a speciﬁc good, country l is the cheapest location for i to serve market n.
This is equivalent to c
g
lidnl=z
g
li ≤ c
g
jidnj=z
g
ji,o rz
g
ji ≤ z
g
liðc
g
jidnjÞ=ðc
g
lidnlÞ for all j ≠ l. Without
loss of generality, assume that l 5 1. The probability that z
g
ji ≤ anjiz
g
1i for all j ≠ 1
where anji ; ðc
g
jidnjÞ=ðc
g
1idn1Þ is given by ∫
`
0 F1ðz;an2iz;:::;anIiz;TiÞdz. But
F1ðz;an2iz;:::;anIiz;TiÞ
5 ½ðc
g
1idn1Þ
vð~ c
g
niÞ
2v 
12½1=ð12rÞ Tivz
2v21exp½2ðc
g
1idn1Þ
vTið~ c
g
niÞ
2vz
2v 
and
E
`
0
vðc
g
1idn1Þ
vTið~ c
g
niÞ
2vz
2v21exp½2ðc
g
1idn1Þ
vTið~ c
g
niÞ
2vz
2v dz 5 1:
This implies that
E
`
0
F1ðz;an2iz;:::;anIiz;TiÞdz 5
ðc
g
1idn1Þ
2v=ð12rÞ
olðc
g
lidnlÞ
2v=ð12rÞ ; ðA1Þ
and, hence, of the goods that country n buys that are produced with country i
technologies, the share that is produced in country l is given by the expression
in ðA1Þ.
Combining the two previous results, we conclude that the share of interme-
diate goods bought by country n that are produced in country l with country i
technologies is given by the right-hand side of equation ð7Þ. The corresponding
result for ﬁnal goods is derived simply by letting dnl → ` for n ≠ l.
The previous result relates to shares of goods, whereas we are interested in ex-
penditure shares. Just as in Eaton and Kortum ð2002Þ, however, the price distri-
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All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditionsbution of the goods that country n buys is independent of the production loca-
tion and is also independent of the origin of the technology with which the good
is produced. This implies that all the adjustment is on the “extensive margin”
and that the share of goods that country n buys from country l that is produced
withcountry i technologies isalso the shareofthe totalexpendituresbycountry n
that is allocated to those goods. To see this, focus on intermediate goods and condi-
tion on market n and technologies from country i. The probability that p
g
ni ≤ p
and that l is the least-cost production location to reach n is the probability that
dnlc
g
li=z
g
li ≤ p and dnjc
g
ji=z
g
ji ≥ dnlc
g
li=z
g
li for all j,o rz
g
li ≥ dnlc
g
li=p and z
g
ji ≤ z
g
liðdnjc
g
jiÞ=ðdnlc
g
liÞ
for all j. Without loss of generality, assume that l 5 1 and again let anji ;
ðdnjc
g
jiÞ=ðdn1c
g
1iÞ. We want to compute ∫
`
dn1c
g
1i=pF1ðz;an2iz;:::;anIiz;TiÞdz. A procedure
similar to the one used to get equation ðA1Þ establishes that
E
`
dn1c
g
1i=p
F1ðz;an2iz;:::;anIizÞdz
5
ðdn1c
g
1iÞ
2v=ð12rÞ
olðc
g
lidnlÞ
2v=ð12rÞ f1 2 exp½2Tið~ c
g
niÞ
2vp
v g:
To get the distribution of prices in market n conditionalon the good produced in
country1withtechnologyi,weneedtodividebyðc
g
1idn1Þ
2v=ð12rÞ=olðc
g
lidnlÞ
2v=ð12rÞ. This
yields a probability equal to
G
g
niðpÞ 5 1 2 exp½2Tið~ c
g
niÞ
2vp
v : ðA2Þ
Since this expression does not depend on country 1, it implies that for market n
and conditioning on country i technologies, the distribution of p for goods that
actually are produced in l is the same for l 5 1; 2; :::; I. But independence
of productivity draws across i allows us to apply the results from Eaton and
Kortum ð2002Þ to establish that the distribution of prices for goods that n ac-
tually buys from i is G
g
nðpÞ 5 1 2 exp½2Tið~ c
g
niÞ
2vp
v  for all i. This implies that the
average price of goods is the same, regardless of where they are produced and of
the origin of the technology. As a consequence, expenditure shares for n across
ðl, iÞ combinations are the same as the shares of goods bought by n across ðl, iÞ
combinations. This ﬁnally establishes that expenditure shares for intermediates
are given by the expressions in ð7Þ. The result in equation ð6Þ is simply obtained
by letting dnl → ` for n ≠ l. This same reasoning establishes that the price index
for ﬁnal and intermediate goods is given by equation ð8Þ.
Expenditures on Intermediate Goods
Here, we establish that total expenditures on intermediate goods is just a con-
stantfractionoftotal expendituresonﬁnalgoods.Firstnotethat PnQn is the total
costof the intermediate goods used in production incountry n.We ﬁrst calculate
thetotalcostoftheintermediategoodsproduced incountryn.ThisiswnL
g
n 1 P
g
nQ
g
n,
plus the intraﬁrm imports of foreign multinationals located in n, oi ≠nqniY
g
ni, mi-
nus the exports of the domestic input bundle for intermediates to country n’s
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g
in. Hence, the total cost of intermediate goods pro-
duced in country n is
wnL
g
n 1 P
g
nQ
g
n 1 o
i ≠n
qniY
g
ni 2 o
i ≠n
qinY
g
in:
Inequilibrium,thismust beequaltothevalueofintermediategoodsproducedin
country n. Hence,
wnL
g
n 1 P
g
n Q
g
n 1 o
i ≠n
qniY
g
ni 2 o
i ≠n
qinY
g
in 5 o
i
Y
g
ni: ðA3Þ
But Y
g
ni 5ojp
g
jniP
g
j Q j impliesoiY
g
ni 5oiojp
g
jniP
g
j Q j. Together with Xjn 5oip
g
jniP
g
j Q j
1 qjnY
g
jn, we have
o
i
Y
g
ni 5 o
i
p
g
nniP
g
nQn 1 o
j ≠n
ðXjn 2 qjnY
g
jnÞ:
Substituting into equation ðA3Þ and simplifying, we get
wnL
g
n 1 P
g
n Q
g
n 1 o
i ≠n
qniY
g
ni 5 o
i
p
g
nniP
g
n Qn 1 o
i ≠n
Xin:
Using the trade balance condition ð12Þ to substitute oi ≠nXin for oi ≠nXni, using
equation ð11Þ, and simplifying, yields
wnL
g
n 1 P
g
n Q
g
n 5 P
g
nQn; ðA4Þ
where we have used that oiojp
g
nij 5 1.
Now, we know that
L
f
n
Q f
n
5

a
1 2 a

P
g
n
wn
ðA5Þ
and
L
g
n
Q g
n
5

b
1 2 b

P
g
n
wn
: ðA6Þ
Equations ðA4Þ and ðA6Þ imply that Q
g
n 5 ð1 2 bÞQn, and combining this with
Q
f
n 1 Q
g
n 5 Qn, we have
Q
f
n 5 bQn: ðA7Þ
Plugging Q
g
n 5 ð1 2 bÞQn back into equation ðA4Þ, we get wnL
g
n 5 bP
g
nQn, and
using L
g
n 1 L
f
n 5 Ln, we have
wnðLn 2 L
f
nÞ 5 bP
g
n Qn: ðA8Þ
From equations ðA5Þ and ðA7Þ, we get wnLfn 5 ½a=ð1 2 aÞ bP
g
n Qn. Using equa-
tion ðA8Þ, we then have L
f
n 5 ½a=ð1 2 aÞ ðLn 2 L
f
nÞ, and, hence, L
f
n 5 aLn. Plug-
ging into equation ðA8Þ, we ﬁnally get ð1 2 aÞwnLn 5 bP
g
nQn,o rP
g
nQn 5 hwnLn.
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In the case with r 5 0, MP ﬂows also satisfy a gravity-like relationship. Using
equation ð10Þ and some manipulation, we have
Y
g
li 5
Tiðc
g
liÞ
2v
ojokTjðc
g
kjdlkÞ
2v Wl; ðA9Þ
where
Wl ; o
n

dnlP
g
l
P g
n
 2v
hwnLn:
The ﬁrst term on the right-hand side of equation ðA9Þ captures the “relative
competitiveness” of country i’s technologies in country l, while Wl can be inter-
preted as country l’s market potential.
30 We can then write
Y
g
li =Wl
Y
g
ii =Wi
5
~ h
g
liP
g
i
P
g
l
 2v
; ðA10Þ
where ~ h
g
li ; c
g
li=c
g
ii is an average relative cost of producing in country l rather than
in country i with country i’s technologies. The term ~ h
g
li in equation ðA10Þ plays
the analogous role of the term dnl in equation ð14Þ.
Proof of Lemma 1
A trade-only model is obtained from our model with h
f
li, h
g
li → ` for all l ≠i.
In this case, equation ð11Þ implies that trade ﬂows satisfy Eaton and Kortum’s
ð2002Þ gravity equation,
Xnl 5
Tlðc
g
l dnlÞ
2v
okTkðc
g
kdnkÞ
2v o
j
Xnj:
If h
g
li → ` for all l ≠i, then equation ð8Þ implies that okTkðc
g
kdnkÞ
2v5 g
vðP
g
nÞ
2v;
hence, using
c
g
n 5 Bw
b
nðP
g
nÞ
12b; ðA11Þ
we have
wn=P
g
n 5 ðgBÞ
21=bT
1=bv
n

Xnn=o
j
Xnj
21=bv
: ðA12Þ
If h
f
li → ` for all l ≠i, then ð8Þ implies that P
f
n 5 gT
21=v
n c
f
n, and together with
c
f
n 5 Aw
a
nðP
g
nÞ
12a; ðA13Þ
30 Rearranging eq. ð14Þ and substituting into the expression for Wl, we get Wl 5
ð ^ Xll=hwlLlÞ
21on ^ Xnl. If there is no intraﬁrm trade, then trade balance impliesonXnl 5 hwlLl,
so Wl 5 ðXll=hwlLlÞ
21hwlLl: larger and more open countries have a higher market potential.
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f
n 5 ðgAÞ
21T
1=v
n ðwn=P
g
nÞ
12a. Using equation ðA12Þ, we ﬁnally
get
wn=P
f
n 5 ~ gT
ð11hÞ=v
n

Xnn=o
j
Xnj
 2h=v
;
where ~ g ; ðgAÞ
21ðgBÞ
2h. This establishes the result for the real wage in the closed
economy in equation ð3Þ, and it also shows that the gains from trade in a trade-
only economy are given by equation ð15Þ.
A similar procedure leads to the formula for the gains from MP in an MP-
only model, which obtains from our model as dnl → ` for all n ≠l. In particular,
equations ð7Þ and ð10Þ imply that Y
g
li 5 ½Tiðc
g
liÞ
2v=oTjðc
g
liÞ
2v ojYlj. Together with
equations ð8Þ and ðA11Þ, this implies that
wn=P
g
n 5 ðgBÞ
21=bT
1=bv
n

Y
g
nn=o
j
Y
g
nj
 21=bv
: ðA14Þ
But equation ð8Þ implies P
f
n 5 gð~ T
f
nÞ
21=vc
f
n, where ~ T
f
n ;oiTiðh
f
niÞ
2v. Together with
equations ðA13Þ and ðA14Þ, we get
wn=P
f
n 5 ~ gð~ T
f
nÞ
1=vT
h=v
n

Y
g
nn=o
j
Y
g
nj
 2h=v
: ðA15Þ
Finally, from equation ð6Þ, we see that
Y
f
nn
ojY
f
nj
5
Tnðc
f
nÞ
2v
oiTiðc
f
niÞ
2v 5
Tn
~ T f
n
: ðA16Þ
Plugging ðA16Þ into ðA15Þ, we ﬁnally get
wn=P
f
n 5 ~ gT
ð11hÞ=v
n

Y
f
nn=o
j
Y
f
nj
 21=v
Y
g
nn=o
j
Y
g
nj
 2h=v
:
From this equation, we get ð16Þ, ð17Þ, and GMP*
n 5 GMP
g*
n   GMP
f *
n . QED
Proof of Proposition 1
Given r 5 0, equations ð10Þ and ð8Þ imply that Y
g
li 5 g
2vTiðc
g
li=P
g
l Þ
2vWl, where
Wl ;onðdnlP
g
l =P
g
nÞ
2vhwnLn. Hence,
Y
g
ll 5 g
2vðc
g
l =P
g
l Þ
2vTlWl: ðA17Þ
With equation ðA11Þ, this implies that
wl =P
g
l 5 ðgBÞ
21=bT
1=bv
l ðY
g
ll=WlÞ
21=bv: ðA18Þ
Letting ~ T
f
n ;oiTiðh
f
niÞ
2v and using ðA13Þ, we get
P
f
n 5 gð~ T
f
nÞ
21=vAw
a
nðP
g
nÞ
12a:
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f
n 5 ðgAÞ
21ð~ T
f
nÞ
1=vðwn=P
g
nÞ
12a. Using equation ðA18Þ, we get
wn=P
f
n 5 ~ gT
h=v
n ð~ T
f
nÞ
1=vðY
g
nn=WnÞ
2h=v: ðA19Þ
But from equation ð14Þ, given a 5 0, and using balanced trade, we get
Wn 5

o
j
Xnj=Xnn

hwnLn: ðA20Þ
When hwnLn 5oiY
g
ni and we plug into equation ðA19Þ, the real wage is then
wn=P
f
l 5 ~ gT
ð11hÞ=v
n

Y
f
nn=o
j
Y
f
nj
 21=v
 

Y
g
nn=o
j
Y
g
nj
 2h=v
 

Xnn=o
j
Xnj
 2h=v
;
ðA21Þ
where we have used equation ðA16Þ to substitute out ~ T
f
n for actual MP ﬂows in
ﬁnal goods ðthis equation is always valid, not only when dnl → ` for all n ≠lÞ.
This immediately implies that
GOn ;
wn=P
f
n
limh
g
li;h
f
li;dnl→` wn=P f
n
5

Y
f
nn=o
j
Y
f
nj
 21=v
 

Y
g
nn=o
j
Y
g
nj
 2h=v
 

Xnn=o
j
Xnj
 2h=v
5 GMP
f *
n   GMP
g*
n   GT*
n:
ðNote that the limit h
g
li, h
f
li, dnl → ` is taken for all l ≠i and n ≠l; the same applies
for all such limits below.Þ
To compute GTn, we need to obtain wn=P
f
n as dnl → ` . Clearly, this implies
that Xnn=ojXnj → 1. But what happens to Y
f
nn=ojY
f
nj and Y
g
nn=ojY
g
nj? First, we know
that Y
f
nn=ojY
f
nj 5 Tn=~ T
f
n, so that MP shares for ﬁnal goods are independent of
trade costs. We now show that something very similar happens for MP shares for
intermediate goods, and Y
g
ll=ojY
g
lj 5 Tl=~ T
g
l , where ~ T
g
l ;oiTiðh
g
liÞ
2v. From equa-
tion ðA17Þ we have
Y
g
ll
ojY
g
lj
5
g
2vðc
g
l =P
g
l Þ
2vTlWl
hwlLl
:
With equation ð8Þ for s 5 g and a 5 r 5 0 and equation ðA20Þ, this implies that
Y
g
ll
ojY
g
lj
5
Tl
~ T
g
l
~ T
g
l ðc
g
l Þ
2v
ok ~ T
g
k ðc
g
k dlkÞ
2v
ojXlj
Xll
5
Tl
~ T
g
l
;
where the last result comes from the fact that, with a 5 r 5 0, equation ð7Þ
implies that
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~ T
g
l ðc
g
l Þ
2v
ok ~ T
g
k ðc
g
kdnkÞ
2v o
j
Xnj:
Since neither Y
f
nn=ojY
f
nj nor Y
g
ll=ojY
g
lj is dependent on trade costs, we conclude
that
GTn ;
wn=P
f
n
limdnl→` wn=P f
n
5

Xnn=o
j
Xnj
 2h=v
5 GT*
n:
QED
Proof of Proposition 2
Here, we compare GMPn with GMP*
n ; GMP
f *
n   GMP
g*
n . First, note that neither
trade ﬂows nor MP ﬂows in intermediate goods depend on MP in ﬁnal goods.
Hence,
GMP
f
n ;
wn=P
f
n
limh
f
li →` wn=P f
n
5

Tn
~ T f
n
 21=v
5

Y
f
nn
ojY
f
nj
 21=v
5 GMP
f *
n :
Next, the gains from MP in intermediates, GMP
g
n, are determined by GMP
g*
n 5
ðY
g
nn=ojY
g
njÞ
2h=v together with the way in which Xnn=ojXnj changes as we take
h
g
li → `. Let lnn ; Xnn=ojXnj andlnn the domestic demand share for the counter-
factual equilibrium with h
g
li → `.T h e n
GMP
g
n ;
wn=P
f
n
limh
g
li →` wn=P f
n
5

Y
g
nn=o
j
Y
g
nj
 2h=v
lnn
lnn
 2h=v
5 GMP
g*
n

lnn
lnn
 2h=v
:
Since the second term on the right-hand side is, in general, not equal to one, this
implies that GMP
g
n ≠ GMP*g
n . Finally, we have GMPn 5 GMP
f
n   GMP
g
n.H e n c e ,
GMPn ≠ GMP*
n.Q E D
Characterization of the Symmetric Equilibrium
Undersymmetry,we canexplicitly solve for tradeand MPshares, aswellas for the
real wage. Using the results for the expenditure shares in equation ð6Þ, we have
y
f ;
Y
f
ni
wnLn
5
h
2v
1 1 ðI 2 1Þh2v
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Y
f
nn
wnLn
5
1
1 1 ðI 2 1Þh2v : ðA22Þ
Similarly, using equation ð7Þ, we have
y
g ;
Y
g
ni
hwnLn
5 y
g
1 1 y
g
B;0 1 y
g
B;1
for i ≠ n. The term y
g
1 captures MP for goods destined to stay in the domestic
market, y
g
B;0 is MP for goods that go back to the country where the technology
originates, and y
g
B;1 is MP for goods that go to a third market. Both y
g
B;0 and y
g
B;1
take place through BMP. The respective formulas are
y
g
1 5
D
2r=ð12rÞ
1 m
2~ v
D0 1 ðI 2 1ÞD1
;
y
g
B;0 5
D
2r=ð12rÞ
0 ðmdÞ
2~ v
D0 1 ðI 2 1ÞD1
;
y
g
B;1 5
ðI 2 2ÞD
2r=ð12rÞ
1 ðmdÞ
2~ v
D0 1 ðI 2 1ÞD1
;
where D0, D1, and ~ v are deﬁned in the text. This implies that
Y
g
nn
hwnLn
5
D
2r=ð12rÞ
0 1 ðI 2 1ÞD
2r=ð12rÞ
1 d
2~ v
D0 1 ðI 2 1ÞD1
: ðA23Þ
The equilibrium trade share is given by
x ;
Xnl
hwnLn
5 x0;B 1 x1 1 x1;B 1 qy
g
for l ≠ n. The term x0;B captures the imports of goods produced abroad ðin lÞ with
the importer’s ðcountry nÞ own technologies through BMP; the term x1 is the
standard component associated with imports from a country that used that
country’s technology for production ðcountry l uses its technologies to export to
nÞ; the term x1;B captures imports of goods produced with country l technologies
in countries other than l ðBMPÞ; and the term qy
g captures imports of the input
bundle from l for domestic operations of country l multinationals. The formulas
for x0;B and x1;B are the same as the formulas for y
g
B;0 and y
g
B;1, respectively, while
x1 5 y
g
1ðd=mÞ
2~ v. This implies that
Xnn
hwnLn
5
D
2r=ð12rÞ
0 1 ðI 2 1ÞD
2r=ð12rÞ
1 m
2~ v
D0 1 ðI 2 1ÞD1
: ðA24Þ
It is easy to see from these results that the total value of BMP as a share of to-
tal MP is
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y
g
B;0 1 y
g
B;1
y f 1 yg :
In the limit as r → 1, technology draws become the same across production
locations, and k → 0. Further, when h > d, y
g → 0 and there is only trade, x 5
d
2v=½1 1 ðI 2 1Þd
2v . On the contrary, when h < d, trade is just associated with
MP ﬂows, x 5 qm
2v=½1 1 ðI 2 1Þm
2v  5 qy
g.
Proof of Proposition 3
We want to compute GO, GT, and GMP under symmetry. We start by computing
the real wage when there is trade and MP and under isolation. We know that
wi 5 w, for all i, and that the price index for intermediate goods collapses to
P
g 5 ðgBÞ
1=b½D0 1 ðI 2 1ÞD1 
21=bvT
21=bvw:
The price index for ﬁnal goods is
P
f 5 g½1 1 ðI 2 1Þh
2v 
21=vT
21=vAw
aðP
gÞ
12a:
With the result for P
g above, the real wage is then
w
P f 5 ~ g
21T
ð11hÞ=v½1 1 ðI 2 1Þh
2v 
1=v½D0 1 ðI 2 1ÞD1 
h=v; ðA25Þ
where ~ g ; ðgAÞðgBÞ
h. The real wage under isolation is obtained by letting d → `
and h → ` in equation ðA25Þ. Hence,
GO ;
w=P
f
limh;d→` w=P f 5 ½1 1 ðI 2 1Þh
2v 
1=v½D0 1 ðI 2 1ÞD1 
h=v:
To calculate GT, we need to calculate the real wage when there is only MP. When
we let d → ` in equation ðA25Þ, the real wage with only MP is
lim
d→` w=P
f 5 ~ g
21½1 1 ðI 2 1Þh
2v 
1=v½1 1 ðI 2 1Þ~ m
2v 
h=vT
ð11hÞ=v;
where ~ m is as deﬁned in the text. Hence,
GT ;
w=P
f
limd→` w=P f 5

D0 1 ðI 2 1ÞD1
1 1 ðI 2 1Þ~ m2v
h=v
:
Similarly, when we let h → ` in equation ðA25Þ, the real wage when there is only
trade is
lim
h→`
w=P
f 5 ~ g
21½1 1 ðI 2 1Þd
2v 
h=vT
ð11hÞ=v;
and, hence,
GMP ;
w=P
f
limh→` w=P f 5 ½1 1 ðI 2 1Þh
2v 
1=v

D0 1 ðI 2 1ÞD1
1 1 ðI 2 1Þd2v
h=v
:
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f and the sec-
ond term is GMP
g. QED
Proof of Proposition 4
From proposition 3, lemma 1, and equation ðA24Þ, we have GT=GT*5
ðB
0=B*Þ
2h=v, where B*; D
2r=ð12rÞ
0 1 ðI 2 1ÞD
2r=ð12rÞ
1 m
2~ v and B
0; 1 1 ðI 2 1Þm
2v.
Again, D0, D1, ~ v, and ~ m are deﬁned as in the text.
Part a: For r 5 0, B*5 1 1 ðI 2 1Þm
2v. But a > 0 implies that ~ m > m and,
hence, ~ m
2v < m
2v,s o1 1 ðI 2 1Þ~ m
2v < 1 1 ðI 2 1Þm
2vandB* > B
0.Then,GT > GT*
and trade is an MP complement. For r > 0 and a 5 0, we have ~ m 5 m. Hence,
using the deﬁnitions for D0 and D1, we get
B*2 B 5 D
2r=ð12rÞ
0 1 ðI 2 1ÞD
2r=ð12rÞ
1 m
2~ v2 1 2 ðI 2 1Þm
2v
5 ½1 1 ðI 2 1ÞðmdÞ
2~ v 
2r2 1 1 ðI 2 1Þm
2v
  f½ðd=mÞ
2~ v1 1 1 ðI 2 2Þd
2~ v 
2r2 1g:
This is negative if r > 0.
Part b: For a > 0, limy→1 ~ m → ` . Thus, limy→1 GT 5 ½D0 1 ðI 2 1ÞD1 
h=v. Thus,
for trade to be an MP complement when y → 1, we need to show that ½D0 1
ðI 2 1ÞD1 
h=v > GT*. But this is equivalent to B* > 1. Using the deﬁnitions for
D0 and D1, we have
B*5 ½1 1 ðI 2 1ÞðmdÞ
2~ v 
2r1 ðI 2 1Þm
2~ v½d
2~ v1 m
2~ v1 ðI 2 2ÞðmdÞ
2~ v 
2r:
For r 5 0, B*5 1 1 ðI 2 1Þm
2v > 1. For 0 < r < 1 and d 5 1, B*5 ½1 1 ðI 2
1Þm
2~ v 
12r > 1. Since B* is increasing in d, it follows that B* > 1 for all d.
Now, consider again the case with a > 0 and let y → ` . We want to show that
if h < d, then trade is an MP substitute, or GT < GT*. We have limy→` ~ m 5 h
and limy→` m 5 min½h; d  5 h.T h e nG T< GT* in the limit when y → ` is equiv-
alent to
1 1 ðI 2 1Þh
2v > ½1 1 ðI 2 1ÞðhdÞ
2~ v 
2r
1 ðI 2 1Þh
2~ v½d
2~ v1 h
2~ v1 ðI 2 2ÞðhdÞ
2~ v 
2r:
The ﬁrst term on the right-hand side of this inequality is smaller than one, so it
is sufﬁcient to show that
h
2v > h
2~ v½d
2~ v1 h
2~ v1 ðI 2 2ÞðhdÞ
2~ v 
2r:
If d → `, then the right-hand side is h
2v. Since the right-hand side is increasing in
d,t h e ni tm u s tb el o w e rt h a nh
2v for any ﬁnite d.Q E D
Proof of Proposition 5
From proposition 3, lemma 1, and equation ðA23Þ, we have
GMP
g
GMP
g* 5

1 1 ðI 2 1Þd
2v
D
2r=ð12rÞ
0 1 ðI 2 1ÞD
2r=ð12rÞ
1 d2~ v
2h=v
:
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g*5 GMP
g for r 5 0. We want to show that GMP
g* > GMP
g
for 0 < r < 1. From the deﬁnitions of D0 and D1 in the text, GMP
g* > GMP
g is
equivalent to
1 1 ðI 2 1Þd
2v > ½1 1 ðI 2 1ÞðmdÞ
2~ v 
2r
1 ðI 2 1Þ½1 1 ðm=dÞ
2~ v1 ðI 2 2Þm
2~ v 
2rd
2v:
This is clearly true for 0 < r < 1. QED
Proof of Proposition 6
The formula for expenditure shares of intermediate goods in equation ð7Þ im-
plies that, under frictionless trade and with a 5 0, we have
p
g
SSS 5
TSð~ c
g
SÞ
2v
TNð~ c
g
NÞ
2v 1 TSð~ c
g
SÞ
2v  
ðc
g
SÞ
2~ v
ð~ c
g
SÞ
2~ v ;
p
g
SSN 5
TNð~ c
g
NÞ
2v
TNð~ c
g
NÞ
2v 1 TSð~ c
g
SÞ
2v  
ðhc
g
SÞ
2~ v
ð~ c
g
NÞ
2~ v ;
where ~ c
g
N ; ½ðc
g
NÞ
2~ v1 ðh
gc
g
SÞ
2~ v 
21=~ v, ~ c
g
S ; ½ðh
gc
g
NÞ
2~ v1 ðc
g
SÞ
2~ v 
21=~ v, and ~ v ; v=ð1 2 rÞ.
Analogous expressions hold for p
g
NNN and p
g
NNS. The trade balance condition then
entails
ð1 2 p
g
SSS 2 p
g
SSNÞhwSLS 5 ð1 2 p
g
NNN 2 p
g
NNSÞhwNLN:
No MP in intermediates ðh
g → `Þ implies that pSSN 5 0, ~ c
g
N 5 c
g
N, and ~ c
g
S 5 c
g
S,s o
the trade balance condition implies that ðjust as in Alvarez and Lucas ½2007 Þ
wN=wS 5 n
1=ð11vbÞ;
where n ; ðTN=LNÞ=ðTS=LSÞ. The real wage in North is then
lim
hg→`
wN
P
f
N
5 ½TN 1 TSðh
fÞ
2v 
1=vðTN 1 TSn
zÞ
h=v; ðA26Þ
where z ; vb=ð1 1 vbÞ. As one would expect, this does not depend on r ðsince
there is no MPÞ.
Now, consider the case with frictionless MP in intermediates ðh
g 5 1Þ. The
trade balance condition now implies that
wN=wS 5 d ; ðLS=LNÞ
1=ð11~ vbÞ;
while the ﬁnal-goods price index in North is
P
f
N 5 ½TN 1 TSðh
fÞ
2v 
21=vðTN 1 TSÞ
2h=vð1 1 d
~ vbÞ
2h=~ vwN:
Hence,
lim
hg→1wN=P
f
N 5 ½TN 1 TSðh
fÞ
2v 
1=vðTN 1 TSÞ
h=vð1 1 d
~ vbÞ
h=~ v: ðA27Þ
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g
N ≷ 1 is equivalent to
ðTN 1 TSÞ
h=vð1 1 d
~ vbÞ
h=~ v≷ ðTN 1 TSn
zÞ
h=v:
This is equivalent to
f ðrÞ ; ½1 1 l
vb=ð12r1vbÞ 
12rðn 1 lÞ 2 n 2 ln
z ≷ 0;
where l ; LS=LN. But
f ð0Þ 5 l
11z½l
2z 1 n=l 1 1 2 ðn=lÞ
z :
On the one hand, since 0 < z < 1, n=l 1 1 > ðn=lÞ
z, for any n=l, implying that
f ð0Þ > 0. On the other hand,
lim
r→1 f ðrÞ 5 l 2 ln
z 5 lð1 2 n
zÞ:
Since v > 1, this expression is negative. It is easy to show that f
0ðrÞ < 0 for
r ∈ ½0; 1Þ, implying that there is a r* ∈ ½0; 1Þ such that f ðr*Þ 5 0. Hence, we
conclude that GMP
g
N > 1 for r < r* and GMP
g
N < 1 for r > r*. QED
Appendix B
Data
The UNCTAD measure of MP includes both local sales in n and exports to any
other country, including the home country i. Of the 342 country pairs, the
number of observations for which we have available data drops to 216. For a
detailed description of the UNCTAD MP data, see Ramondo ð2012Þ. The data
are averages over the period 1996–2001.
Total expenditures on intermediate goods in the model are given by hwnLn,
while in the data, we compute a measure of total expenditures on manufacturing
from all the countries in our sample. This measure is computed as gross pro-
duction in manufacturing in country n, plus total imports of manufacturing
goods into country n from the remaining countries in the sample, minus total
manufacturing exports from country n to the rest of the world. Data on these
three variables for each country are from the STAN database ðan average over
the period 1996–2001Þ. Total expenditures on ﬁnal goods in the model are wnLn,
while in the data, we use GDP for country n plus total imports into country n
from the remaining 18 OECD countries in the sample, minus total exports from
countryn totherest ofthe world. Dataon GDPare from the World Development
Indicators, in current dollars, and total exports and imports are from 2005
United Nations trade date by Robert Feenstra and Robert Lipsey ðavailable from
the National Bureau of Economic ResearchÞ.
We use intraﬁrm imports by multinationals’ foreign afﬁliates from their home
country as the empirical counterpart for imports of the national input bundle
from the home country for MP, normalized by gross production of afﬁliates from
i in n, qniY
g
ni=ðY
g
ni 1 Y
f
niÞ. We combine data on intraﬁrm exports from US parent
companies to their afﬁliates abroad with data on imports done by foreign af-
ﬁliates located in the United States from their parent ﬁrms, an average over the
period 1999–2003.
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goods, Y
g
ni=ðY
g
ni 1 Y
f
niÞ, we use data on gross production of afﬁliates from country
i in n in the manufacturing sector as the share of total gross production for
afﬁliates of multinational ﬁrms from i in n. The relevant data on bilateral MP
in manufacturing are also for i 5 US or n 5 US, an average over the period
1999–2003.
We are able to compute BMP in manufacturing when the United States is the
source country, again as an average over the period 1999–2003. The BEA divides
total sales of American afﬁliates produced in country l into sales to the local
market, to the United States, and to other foreign markets. This is the empirical
counterpart for on ≠lp
g
nliX
g
n=Y
g
li from i 5 US in a country l belonging to the
OECDð19Þ. We average out across l’s and obtain an average bilateral BMP share
for the US afﬁliates in the OECDð19Þ. A similar procedure yields the average
bilateral BMP share for US afﬁliates of foreign multinationals. The caveat is that
the data for afﬁliates of foreign multinationals in the United States for the manu-
facturing sector are available for only seven countries in our sample. Hence, we
also compute and present the BMP share for all sectors.
Bilateral distance is the distance in kilometers between the largest cities in the
two countries. Common languageis a dummyequalto oneif bothcountries have
the same ofﬁcial language or if more than 20 percent of the population share the
same language ðeven if it is not the ofﬁcial oneÞ. Common border is equal to one
if two countries share a border. The source for these data is the Centre d’Etudes
Prospectives et Informations Internationales.
Appendix C
Additional Tables
TABLE C1
Summary Statistics: Data
Mean
Standard
Deviation Observations
Distance ðin thousands of kilometersÞ 6.006 6.009 342
Common language .110 .310 342
Common border .090 .280 342
Bilateral trade share .021 .038 342
Bilateral MP share .029 .063 216
Bilateral intraﬁrm share* .072 .072 34
Bilateral MP share in manufacturing* .480 .130 33
* Flows from/to the United States.
TABLE C2
Data and Model’s Variables
R&D
Employment
Real GDP
per Worker Ln Tn
Australia .007 .81 .12 .09
Austria .005 .79 .05 .03
Belgium .007 .88 .06 .04
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R&D
Employment
Real GDP
per Worker Ln Tn
Canada .006 .80 .15 .11
Denmark .006 .79 .04 .03
Spain .004 .69 .16 .07
Finland .012 .73 .03 .05
France .006 .77 .25 .18
Great Britain .005 .70 .24 .15
Germany .006 .73 .32 .23
Greece .003 .55 .05 .02
Italy .003 .87 .28 .09
Japan .010 .63 .46 .52
Netherlands .005 .81 .09 .06
Norway .008 .87 .04 .03
New Zealand .005 .63 .03 .01
Portugal .003 .54 .05 .02
Sweden .008 .70 .05 .05
United States .009 1.00 1.00 1.00
Note.—R&D employment is calculated as a share of total employment. Real GDP per
worker, Ln, and Tn are calculated relative to the United States; Ln and Tn are from the
calibrated model with r 5 0. R&D employment and real GDP per worker are from the data.
TABLE C3
Multinational Production Shares: Data and Model
Data Model with r 5 0 Model with r 5 0:5
Outward
MP
Inward
MP
Outward
MP
Inward
MP
Outward
MP
Inward
MP
Australia .15 .29 .08 .09 .08 .12
Austria .06 .36 .23 .61 .23 .58
Belgium .66 .56 .42 .67 .42 .63
Canada .28 .51 .17 .46 .18 .45
Denmark .19 .14 .20 .39 .23 .42
Spain .03 .27 .08 .16 .10 .23
Finland .51 .25 .31 .28 .39 .29
France .16 .21 .17 .10 .20 .12
Great Britain .10 .45 .21 .33 .22 .32
Germany .40 .28 .16 .07 .20 .09
Greece .01 .08 .09 .48 .10 .56
Italy .04 .14 .07 .12 .08 .18
Japan .17 .06 .01 .003 .02 .01
Netherlands 1.11 .62 .19 .28 .22 .33
Norway .19 .10 .22 .37 .26 .39
New Zealand .03 .73 .11 .70 .10 .64
Portugal .04 .60 .08 .51 .09 .58
Sweden .35 .40 .24 .27 .28 .30
United States .17 .14 .09 .02 .11 .02
Average .24 .33 .17 .31 .18 .33
Note.—Outward MP is the total gross value of production for foreign afﬁliates from
country i. Inward MP is the total gross value of production for foreign afﬁliates in country l.
Flows are normalized by a country’s GDP.
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Trade Shares: Data and Model
Data
Model with r 5 0:
Imports 5 Exports
Model with r 5 0:5:
Imports 5 Exports Imports Exports
Australia .24 .11 .09 .10
Austria .53 .38 .64 .60
Belgium .92 .82 .72 .72
Canada .48 .54 .48 .48
Denmark .54 .48 .56 .55
Spain .27 .20 .31 .35
Finland .30 .39 .52 .54
France .30 .30 .32 .36
Great Britain .34 .27 .26 .30
Germany .26 .34 .27 .31
Greece .32 .08 .44 .39
Italy .21 .22 .25 .29
Japan .05 .10 .03 .04
Netherlands .62 .76 .47 .49
Norway .42 .28 .53 .53
New Zealand .35 .28 .28 .24
Portugal .40 .28 .51 .44
Sweden .40 .49 .45 .48
United States .12 .09 .07 .08
Average .37 .34 .38 .38
Note.—Trade shares are for manufacturing. Trade ﬂows are normalized by the country’s
total manufacturing expenditures ðgross value of production minus total exports plus
imports from the countries in the sample, in manufacturingÞ.
TABLE C5
Gains from Openness, Trade, and Multinational Production: Independence
GO*
n GT*
n GMP*
n Ln
Australia 1.118 1.033 1.082 3.3
Austria 1.209 1.093 1.106 1.5
Belgium 1.599 1.343 1.191 1.6
Canada 1.261 1.081 1.166 4.4
Denmark 1.137 1.096 1.037 1.2
Spain 1.116 1.039 1.074 4.7
Finland 1.116 1.044 1.069 1.0
France 1.103 1.044 1.056 7.1
Great Britain 1.197 1.051 1.139 7.0
Germany 1.119 1.037 1.079 9.3
Greece 1.069 1.048 1.020 1.4
Italy 1.064 1.028 1.035 7.9
Japan 1.022 1.006 1.015 13.4
Netherlands 1.368 1.122 1.220 2.7
Norway 1.091 1.066 1.024 1.1
New Zealand 1.365 1.053 1.296 .7
Portugal 1.290 1.064 1.213 1.4
Sweden 1.190 1.062 1.121 1.6
United States 1.053 1.015 1.037 28.7
Note.—The variables GO*
n,G T *
n, and GMP*
n refer, respectively, to the gains from open-
ness, trade, and multinational production, for country n, under independence. The vari-
able Ln refers to number of units of equipped labor in country n, as a percentage of
OECDð19Þ’s total.
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Gains from Openness, Trade, and Multinational Production: r 5 0
GOn GTn GT*
n GMPn GMP*
n GMP
g
n Ln
Australia 1.032 1.016 1.011 1.022 1.022 1.010 3.3
Austria 1.310 1.157 1.123 1.179 1.197 1.067 1.5
Belgium 1.363 1.189 1.154 1.200 1.224 1.075 1.6
Canada 1.202 1.104 1.075 1.123 1.132 1.048 4.4
Denmark 1.199 1.119 1.097 1.102 1.109 1.042 1.2
Spain 1.080 1.053 1.043 1.040 1.039 1.018 4.7
Finland 1.154 1.103 1.087 1.072 1.074 1.033 1.0
France 1.066 1.050 1.044 1.025 1.023 1.013 7.1
Great Britain 1.118 1.054 1.034 1.086 1.087 1.034 7.0
Germany 1.051 1.040 1.036 1.019 1.016 1.010 9.3
Greece 1.204 1.098 1.068 1.133 1.141 1.052 1.4
Italy 1.060 1.040 1.033 1.030 1.029 1.014 7.9
Japan 1.004 1.004 1.003 1.001 1.001 1.001 13.4
Netherlands 1.143 1.090 1.073 1.073 1.073 1.032 2.7
Norway 1.184 1.111 1.089 1.096 1.101 1.040 1.1
New Zealand 1.265 1.080 1.038 1.223 1.238 1.077 .7
Portugal 1.230 1.115 1.084 1.141 1.152 1.054 1.4
Sweden 1.136 1.087 1.070 1.069 1.070 1.031 1.6
United States 1.012 1.010 1.008 1.005 1.004 1.003 28.8
Note.—The variables GOn,G T n, GMPn, and GMP
g
n refer, respectively, to the gains from
openness,trade,multinationalproduction,andmultinationalproductionintheintermediate-
good sector, for country n;G T *
n and GMP*
n refer to the gains from trade and multinational
production, respectively, from trade-only and MP-only models. The variable Ln refers to the
number of units of equipped labor in country n, as a percentage of OECDð19Þ’s total.
TABLE C7
Gains from Openness, Trade, and Multinational Production: r 5 0.5
GOn GTn GT*
n GMPn GMP*
n GMP
g
n Ln
Australia 1.048 1.025 1.014 1.028 1.035 1.015 3.5
Austria 1.427 1.172 1.129 1.179 1.216 1.049 1.6
Belgium 1.478 1.202 1.185 1.184 1.250 1.047 1.7
Canada 1.282 1.127 1.090 1.128 1.157 1.046 4.4
Denmark 1.320 1.150 1.112 1.120 1.141 1.032 1.3
Spain 1.141 1.079 1.059 1.056 1.068 1.023 4.8
Finland 1.236 1.131 1.110 1.071 1.091 1.017 1.0
France 1.102 1.070 1.062 1.026 1.035 1.009 7.2
Great Britain 1.162 1.078 1.048 1.083 1.105 1.036 7.0
Germany 1.079 1.056 1.051 1.018 1.026 1.005 9.4
Greece 1.346 1.125 1.067 1.184 1.210 1.065 1.5
Italy 1.107 1.062 1.046 1.043 1.053 1.019 8.1
Japan 1.007 1.005 1.005 1.001 1.002 1.000 13.4
Netherlands 1.234 1.122 1.095 1.087 1.104 1.028 2.8
Norway 1.295 1.141 1.106 1.108 1.129 1.029 1.1
New Zealand 1.320 1.100 1.037 1.221 1.262 1.096 .8
Portugal 1.384 1.140 1.082 1.192 1.219 1.063 1.5
Sweden 1.214 1.114 1.090 1.075 1.095 1.023 1.7
United States 1.016 1.012 1.011 1.002 1.005 1.000 27.5
Note.—The variables GOn,G T n, GMPn, and GMP
g
n refer, respectively, to the gains from
openness,trade,multinationalproduction,andmultinationalproductionintheintermediate-
good sector, for country n;G T *
n and GMP*
n refer to the gains from trade and multinational
production, respectively, from trade-only and MP-only models.
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